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THE CASE FOR PREEMPTING STATE MONEY
TRANSMISSION LAWS 
FOR CRYPTO-BASED BUSINESSES 
Carol R. Goforth*
I. INTRODUCTION
Few industries are evolving as rapidly or as dramatically as 
those involving payment systems.1  The recent advent and spread 
of cryptocurrencies and associated trading platforms and ex-
changes,2 as well as ongoing improvements and innovations in 
FinTech generally,3 ensure that this is going to continue for the 
foreseeable future.  Along with this rapid change has come a dy-
namic increase in the number and range of payment startups,4 a 
development that has been recognized as likely to redound to the 
* * Carol R. Goforth is a University Professor and the Clayton N. Little Professor of
Law at the University of Arkansas, in Fayetteville. She has decades of experience with cor-
porate, securities and business law issues in the U.S., and has recently published a growing
interest in crypto. She is the author of REGULATION OF CRYPTOTRANSACTIONS (West Aca-
demic, 2020).
1. “There is no denying that adoption of mobile payments and banking is picking up
speed.  Nearly 40% of U.S. consumers have now used at least one digital payment service, 
. . . and more than 60% of consumers are already regular users of mobile banking app.”  
Richard Yao, The Evolution of Payments & What It Means for Financial Services, MEDIUM 
(Jun. 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/G94P-XMK5]. 
2. “Payment businesses have gone through a revolution in the last few years.  From
blockchain, and FinTech to AI and cryptocurrencies, the world of international commerce is 
moving faster than ever.”  Ilker Koksal, The Rise of Crypto as Payment Currency, FORBES 
(Aug. 23, 2019), [https://perma.cc/U22F-8NG7].  A trading platform or crypto exchange is 
simply an online platform in which one kind of digital asset may be exchanged for another 
based on the relative market values of the assets being traded.  Some exchanges allow crypto 
to be exchanged for fiat currencies, although most trade only in cryptoassets. 
3. Generally speaking, Fintech is technology that impacts the delivery of financial ser-
vices, and “[i]f you were asked today to name one sector that has evolved so fast in the past 
few decades, you’d not be mistaken to mention the financial space.”  Fintech – The Evolution 
of Financial Technology, FINSMES (Jan. 31, 2019), [https://perma.cc/JZ33-44KT].  
4. “Within the last couple of years, FinTech and especially Payments has seen some
amazing companies emerge out of nowhere.  Most notably are of course Stripe and Square, 
which have been able to amass valuations of $9.2 and $18.9 Billion (valuation Tuesday April 
3rd, 2018) respectively.”  Dwayne Gefferie, The New Business Model of the Payments In-
dustry, MEDIUM (Apr. 4, 2018), [https://perma.cc/LJG8-2L5Q] (emphasis in original). 
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benefit of consumers and the broader economy.5  The problem is 
simply that regulation is not keeping up with innovation. 
Historically, money transmitters were businesses designed 
to help customers get their money from one location to a third 
party in a different location.  The quintessential examples of con-
ventional money transmitters are companies like Western Union 
and Moneygram.6  However, regulations that worked well to pro-
tect consumers dealing with that kind of enterprise do not always 
translate well to customers involved in the online world of bitcoin 
and crypto purchasing and trading.  Today, businesses set up to 
hold virtual assets for the convenience of customers or to help 
customers exchange virtual assets, and even companies distrib-
uting their own cryptoassets, are opening themselves to potential 
liability for operating as unlicensed money transmitters.  Busi-
nesses that try to comply with legal requirements are often over-
whelmed by the conflicting patchwork of laws and regulations at 
the state level.  
Obviously, when customers entrust a business with their 
money, expecting it to be delivered to a third party, there is a wide 
range of possible negative outcomes.  The business might ab-
scond with the funds or might fail to deliver them to the correct 
person as a result of negligence or malfeasance, or even because 
of bankruptcy.7  State money transmitter laws were specifically 
5. “[S]maller start-up fintech firms now provide much of the innovation backbone in
the payments industry.  Better positioned to create new consumer-focused digital solutions, 
these agile fintech firms are the perfect partners for legacy financial services organizations 
who need to become more responsive to the digital consumer . . . .”  Jim Marous, Top 10 
Trends Rocking the Future of Payments, FIN. BRAND (Nov. 6, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/EL8R-RTC7].  
6. “Western Union and Moneygram are classic examples of money transmitters . . . .”
Benjamin Lo, Fatal Fragments: The Effect of Money Transmission Regulation on Payments 
Innovation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 111, 112 (2016).  Accord Jennifer Windh, Peer-to-Peer 
Payments: Surveying a Rapidly Changing Landscape, 15 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP., 
Jan. 2012, at §§ 1, 3.2.2, 4.3 (Visa and MasterCard are also longstanding players in the pay-
ments industry).  See also Kevin V. Tu, Perfecting Bitcoin, 52 GA. L. REV. 505, 512 (2018) 
(using Western Union as an example of a conventional money transmitter).   
7. One source, in discussing the historical antecedents to state money transmitter laws,
pointed to the need to protect immigrants in the early 1900s, who wanted to send money to 
their native countries, but were often subject to abusive and fraudulent practices.  “Princi-
pally, these risks include high fees and the possibility of fraud (i.e., that the transmitted funds 
may never be received by the intended recipients).”  Andrea Lee Negroni, Risky Business: 
State Regulation of Money Transmitters, GOODWIN LAW: CLEAR NEWS (Spring 2003), 
[https://perma.cc/BK2W-Z55C].  This same source pointed to the failure of a regional money 
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designed to address this kind of risk, typically by imposing licens-
ing, safety, and soundness requirements on businesses interacting 
with each state’s citizens.8  These requirements generally include 
things like submitting to an initial and annual examination con-
ducted at the business’s expense; providing assurance of good 
character for the licensee and its principals; posting of surety 
bonds or maintaining adequate collateral with specified charac-
teristics; maintaining minimum net worth; and submitting regular 
financial reports, which are often required to be audited in accord-
ance with generally accepted accounting principles.9 
The internet and exponential growth of e-commerce compli-
cated this scenario dramatically.10  State money transmitter laws 
were drafted broadly and have been broadly construed, setting the 
stage for application of rules to products and businesses that are 
substantially different from those involved in conventional 
money transmission.  The statutes are so broadly worded that in a 
number of states, they have been found to cover not only online 
and mobile payment systems,11 but also virtual currencies, such 
as bitcoin (which is also referred to as a cryptocurrency, cryp-
toasset, or simply as crypto).12 
order issuer in the 1980s as another possible “precipitating event for the growth of regulation 
of money transmitters.”  Id. 
8. “Each state separately licenses and regulates money transmitters that engage in
money transmission to their residents.”  Money Transmitter Licensing Law, BLOCKCHAIN 
LAW GUIDE, [https://perma.cc/56US-AHUM].  
9. See id.  The exact parameters of each state’s laws are different, although most of
these requirements are present in some form in each state that chooses to regulate money 
transmitters.  For a further consideration of the varying state regulations, see infra Part VI.B. 
of this Article. 
10. Businesses that facilitate payments online can work in ways that are similar to con-
ventional money transmitters.  Money can be transferred by a customer to an online payment 
processer, such as PayPal, and that intermediary will then transfer the funds as directed.  The 
primary difference is that the transfers are all conducted over the internet rather than through 
face-to-face interactions at either end of the transaction.  See, e.g., Who We Are, PAYPAL, 
[https://perma.cc/PR2S-K7X8] (describing that company’s “open digital payments plat-
form”). 
11. For example, PayPal is licensed in all 50 U.S. states, plus the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  See PayPal State Licenses, PAYPAL, 
[https://perma.cc/HVV8-2WZ7]. Although Montana has no state money transmission stat-
ute, PayPal has obtained a Montana Escrow Business License.  Id. 
12. Note that this single sentence mentions “virtual currencies,” “cryptocurrency,”
“cryptoasset,” and “crypto.”  Banking regulators, including FinCEN and state money trans-
mitter regulators, are obviously most concerned with assets that work like money, and it is 
therefore natural that they tend to talk about crypto as a virtual currency, using a very broad 
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The application of state money transmitter laws to crypto is 
not out of step with federal law, given that cryptoassets such as 
bitcoin and ether have been classified as virtual currencies by fed-
eral regulators.13  As a result, however, businesses that assist in 
definition to cover as many kinds of digital interests as possible.  However, some kinds of 
crypto are not designed or intended to function as a currency, and so popular usage, espe-
cially on the international scene, has tended to move towards speaking about “cryptoasset” 
or simply “crypto” when a broader meaning is intended.  See generally Cryptocurrency Vs 6 
Other Crypto Assets Category Classification Types, BITCOIN EXCHANGE GUIDE (July 25, 
2018), [https://perma.cc/88AB-DAHG].  
Terminology is especially important in understanding cryptocurrencies and other cryp-
toassets, but it can also be very confusing.  For a general explanation of terms used, including 
an analysis of some of the ambiguities in current terminology, see Carol Goforth, The Law-
yer’s Cryptionary: A Resource for Talking to Clients About Crypto-Transactions, 41 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 47 (2019).  This Article will use crypto, cryptoassets, and virtual cur-
rency interchangeably.  
13. For the past several years, the U.S. Department of the Treasury Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has accepted that virtual currency is not “currency” under 
regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act because it is not legal tender, but the bureau 
nonetheless subjects a wide range of virtual currency businesses to regulation as money 
transmitters.  John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regula-
tory World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 42 (2016). 
It does this, in part, pursuant to a rule finalized in 2011 that expanded “money transmission 
services” to include “the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for 
currency from one person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that sub-
stitutes for currency to another location or person by any means.”  Bank Secrecy Act Regu-
lations; Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services Businesses, 76 FED. 
REG. 43,585, 43,596 (July 21, 2011) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 2011 Regulations].  Pur-
suant to this definition of money transmission services, FinCEN has made it clear that the 
anti-money laundering (AML) requirements of the BSA apply to persons who facilitate the 
use of crypto by others.  FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2013-G001, APPLICATION OF 
FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL 
CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013), [https://perma.cc/D9FD-RTLA] [hereinafter 2013 
GUIDANCE].  This Guidance applies only to “convertible” cryptoassets, which are defined as 
those that either have “an equivalent value in real currency, or act[] as a substitute for real 
currency.”  Id.  This is, however, broad enough that it includes most crypto.  Updated guid-
ance from FinCEN confirms this approach.  FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2019-G001, 
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS INVOLVING 
CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (May 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/K5JT-ZSBJ]. 
State authorities often take the same approach.  For example, the Conference of State 
Bank Supervisors (CSBS) has determined that, for its purposes, “[v]irtual Currency is a dig-
ital representation of value used as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, or a store of 
value, but does not have legal tender status as recognized by the United States Government.”  
CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY ACTIVITIES CSBS MODEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 2 (2015), 
[https://perma.cc/H9QR-EEHC] (certain exclusions omitted).  
When the New York Department of Financial Services assumed authority over cryp-
toassets it did so by explaining that “virtual currency means any type of digital unit that is 
used as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored value.  Virtual currency shall be 
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the transfer of cryptoassets by issuing them for other forms of 
crypto or fiat, by accepting payment to hold them for customers, 
or by assisting in the exchange of crypto, are being regulated as 
money transmitters.14  
The reality is that rapid growth is often accompanied by 
growing pains.  In the context of crypto, the need to comply with 
myriad state money transmitter requirements is proving to be par-
ticularly painful.  The primary problem appears to be that crypto-
based businesses are finding themselves subject to numerous re-
quirements that were not designed with them in mind.15  This Ar-
ticle suggests that a business focused on the issuance, holding, 
and exchanging of cryptoassets should not be forced to comply 
with the fragmented state money transmitter regulations that 
broadly construed . . . .”  23 N.Y. COMP. CODES & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(p) (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/7MRS-MR22] (emphasis added; limited exemptions omitted).   
The Uniform Law Commission’s (the ULC’s) project, the Uniform Regulation of Vir-
tual Currency Businesses Act (the URVCBA), proclaims that for its purposes “virtual cur-
rency” means: “a digital representation of value that: (1) is used as a medium of exchange, 
unit of account, or store of value; and (2) is not legal tender, whether or not denominated in 
legal tender . . . .”  UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUSINESSES ACT, § 102(23) 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017), [https://perma.cc/3589-Y5BD] (with certain exemptions) (ver-
sions with and without comments are available). 
14. The first federal action against a crypto business for operating an unregistered
money transmission business occurred in 2015.  In that year, Ripple Labs was slapped with 
a $700,000 fine by FinCEN for failing to register as a money services business and comply 
with various federal requirements.  See Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN 
Fines Ripple Labs Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a Virtual Currency Ex-
changer (May 5, 2015), [https://perma.cc/WMN9-6QP7]. 
Individuals can also be prosecuted for operating unregistered money transmission busi-
nesses.  In 2013, Michell Espinoza made three purchases of bitcoins for undercover officers 
who paid in cash and implied that their funds were derived from, or supporting, illegal ac-
tivity.  See Cali Haan, Florida Granted Right to Appeal Previously Dismissed Case Against 
Local Bitcoins Trader, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9UVC-
FUQL] (The purchases were for $500, $1000, $500, and $30,000).  The state of Florida 
prosecuted Espinoza, but the trial court dismissed the action on the grounds that bitcoins 
were not “money,” meaning that the defendant could not have been operating an illegal 
money transmitter business.  State v. Espinoza, No. F14-293, 2016 WL 11613849, at *5 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. July 22, 2016), rev’d 264 So.3d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).  However, on appeal, 
the decision was reversed.  State v. Espinoza, 264 So. 3d. 1055, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2019).    
15. For example, the initial panel discussion at Money 20/20, in 2015, widely acknowl-
edged as the largest payment industry conference in the U.S., was captioned “State Money 
Transmitter Licensing Laws: Are They Killing Payments Industry Innovation?”  Lo, supra 
note 6, at 113.  
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currently exist,16 and instead should be subject to a single, more 
comprehensive federal regulatory regime.  
Following this introduction, Part II of this Article explores 
why crypto-based businesses are different from conventional 
money transmitters, including an examination of crypto’s inher-
ently multi-jurisdictional nature.  Part III considers the public pol-
icy rationales behind the regulation of money transmitters, from 
both a federal and state perspective.  Part IV looks at the defini-
tion of “money transmitter” under federal law and examines when 
this definition is applied to crypto businesses.  Part V considers 
how different states define money transmission and when crypto 
businesses are subjected to these statutes.  Part VI examines the 
scope of existing regulation, starting with federal requirements 
and then moving to state laws, focusing on the range of ap-
proaches and lack of uniformity across jurisdictions.  Part VII 
makes the case for preemption of state regulation of crypto-fo-
cused money transmitters and suggests how federal law could be 
structured to replace the current set of inconsistent and varying 
rules.  
II.  THE INHERENTLY MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
NATURE OF CRYPTOASSETS 
Blockchain, bitcoin, and cryptocurrencies in general have 
been described and discussed in considerable detail elsewhere,17 
and that information will not be repeated here.  Nonetheless, to 
place the issues discussed in this Article into context, a very gen-
eral understanding of cryptoassets and the underlying blockchain 
technology is necessary. 
To understand crypto, it is important to start with the reality 
that there is nothing tangible behind most cryptoassets.  In 
16. This Article does not consider other state laws, such as securities laws, or their
application to crypto-based businesses. 
17. Carol Goforth, Securities Treatment of Tokenized Offerings Under U.S. Law, 46
PEPP. L. REV. 405, 412-15, 427-28 (2019); Goforth, supra note 12; Rebecca M. Bratspies, 
Cryptocurrency and the Myth of the Trustless Transaction, 25 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 1, 12-
15 (2018); Elizabeth Sara Ross, Nobody Puts Blockchain in A Corner: The Disruptive Role 
of Blockchain Technology in the Financial Services Industry and Current Regulatory Issues, 
25 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 353, 359-64 (2017); Scott D. Hughes, Cryptocurrency Regulations 
and Enforcement in the U.S., 45 W. ST. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (2017). 
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contrast to traditional government-backed currencies (fiat),18 
there is no government or central bank, and no corporation or any 
other person ready to make good on the “value” represented by 
any cryptoasset.19  In fact, a cryptoasset is really nothing more 
than a string of numbers recorded on a blockchain.  
In order for this to make sense, you have to know what a 
blockchain is.  In essence, it is a digital record (or ledger) of trans-
actions maintained across several computers that are linked to-
gether in a network.20  Computers in the network may be referred 
to as nodes.21  Transactions that take place on the network’s digi-
tal ledger are time-stamped and aggregated together in blocks.  
Blocks are added to the chain of data only after computers in the 
network have checked the accuracy of the transactions included 
in each block and, in the case of networks governed by proof of 
work consensus protocols such as bitcoim, after a difficult 
18. “Fiat” is Latin for “it shall be,” and although technically it could refer to any me-
dium of exchange not tied to something with tangible value, it has come to refer to “money” 
or “currency” that has value because a government has decreed that it does.  Neale Godfrey, 
A Few Words About Bitcoin . . . Because Fiat Is Not Just a Car, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2015), 
[https://perma.cc/CXB5-U7U3].  
19. Julia Finch, From Silk Road to ATMs: The History of Bitcoin, GUARDIAN (Sept.
14, 2017), [https://perma.cc/BPM9-K6JK].  Note that in the case of some centralized stable-
coins, the issuer may actually be maintaining a reserve sufficient to guarantee value.  For 
example, Tether was supposed to be backed by a reserve of U.S. dollars.  As of this writing, 
the Tether website proudly proclaims that “[e]very tether is always 100% backed by our 
reserves, which include traditional currency and cash equivalents and, from time to time, 
may include other assets and receivables from loans made by Tether to third parties, which 
may include affiliated entities . . . .” Transparency Update, TETHER, 
[https://perma.cc/YXH3-MPWB].  Not everyone agrees that Tether’s claims about being 
backed are believable.  See, e.g., Frances Coppola, Tether’s U.S. Dollar Peg Is No Longer 
Credible, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2019), [https://perma.cc/BH49-BBZV].  Nonetheless, it is cer-
tainly possible that such cryptoassets do or will exist, but they are not the norm. 
20. See, e.g., Ameer Rosic, What Is Blockchain Technology? A Step-by-Step Guide for
Beginners, BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/P2VY-VHAF]. 
21. In a truly peer-to-peer, decentralized network, any computer running the same pro-
tocol can serve as a full node.  Many modern cryptoassets use masternodes or limit who can 
serve as the validator nodes that fulfill the function of validating and adding blocks to the 
chain, rather than allowing all computers to participate in this process.  For a description of 
masternodes and a list of crypto that follows this process, see William M. Peaster, What Are 
Masternodes? Complete Beginner’s Guide, BLOCKONOMI (Sept. 9, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/3PX7-9P3G].  Libra plans on allowing members of the Libra Association 
to serve as validator nodes.  See An Introduction to Libra, LIBRA, [https://perma.cc/DJ6Z-
7VQV].  
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computational problem has been solved.22  The nodes that per-
form this verification or validation service23 automatically check 
the legitimacy of proposed transfers, and the computers that at-
tempt to solve the puzzle or otherwise validate the block are called 
miners.24  A successful miner is typically awarded a predeter-
mined number of coins or tokens (although it is also possible to 
earn a transaction fee instead), and it is this process that allows 
the blockchain to function in the absence of a trusted third-party 
intermediary.25  
The blockchain is inherently distributed because it exists on 
many computers and may or may not be decentralized depending 
on the design of the software (and in particular, whether all nodes 
or only selected ones are entitled to perform verification or vali-
dation services).  Data that has been verified and added to the 
chain is generally immutable because it has been validated by a 
number of computers, is stored on the blockchain on every com-
puter (or node) in the network, and cannot be changed without the 
agreement of those nodes.26  
22. Checking the accuracy generally means verifying that, at the start of the block, the
sender of a particular asset was the owner of those assets, based on the ledger of prior trans-
actions that are already on the blockchain.  See Rui Zhang et al., Security and Privacy on 
Blockchain, ACM COMPUTING SURV. (July 2019), [https://perma.cc/3R3C-XX77]. 
23. These terms have precise meanings for some.  For example, one academic article
explains validation as involving questions about whether the computer code correctly em-
bodies the intended understandings and agreements, while verification asks if the program is 
operating properly by doing what it is supposed to do and only what it is supposed to do, 
without error.  See Daniele Magazzeni et al., Validation and Verification of Smart Contracts: 
A Research Agenda, 50 COMPUTER 50, 53 (Sept. 2017), [https://perma.cc/MVH9-DU4Y]. 
This precision is completely lacking in the popular literature about blockchain.  See, e.g., 
Edzo Botjes, Pulling the Blockchain Apart.. The Transaction Life-Cycle, MEDIUM (Aug. 11, 
2017), [https://perma.cc/XVP7-UPWX] (using validation to describe all of these functions); 
Nolan Bauerle, How Does Blockchain Technology Work?, COINDESK (Mar. 9, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/BC8N-Z3ZP] (using verification to describe these functions).  With apol-
ogies to computer programmers who use these terms with precision, this Article uses the two 
labels somewhat interchangeably. 
Note also that there are alternatives to the proof of work consensus protocol described 
in the text. Proof of stake, for example, allocates mining power based on the number of 
cryptoassets pledged by each miner. For a more detailed explanation of proof of stake mining 
as contrasted with proof of work, see Ameer Rosic, Proof of Work vs Proof of Stake: Basic 
Mining Guide, BLOCKGEEKS (Mar. 24, 2017), [https://perma.cc/42Q7-3E3N0. 
24. See Botjes, supra note 23.
25. For a consideration of blockchain consensus protocols, see Amy Castor, A (Short)
Guide to Blockchain Consensus Protocols, COINDESK (Mar. 4, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/MD4Q-L4T3]. 
26. See Magazzeni et al., supra note 23.
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As mentioned briefly above, the validation process  involves 
something called a consensus protocol, which is necessary to 
avoid the problems associated with the inherent untrustworthiness 
of unknown third parties.  The original consensus protocol, in the 
form of a proof of work,27 was the innovation of the pseudony-
mous Satoshi Yakamoto, who ushered in the blockchain era in 
2008 with a white paper published in 2008 in an online discussion 
of cryptography.28  The focus of that paper was bitcoin, which 
became the first and most successful cryptoasset to date.29  In es-
sence, proof of work depends on a node solving a mathematical 
puzzle, broadcasting the solution to the network, having the other 
nodes confirm that this is the first correct solution, and then add-
ing the block on which that solution occurs to the chain.30  This 
insures that all computers continue to rely on the same chain of 
data. 
As the first successfully established cryptocurrency, bitcoin 
has been the “de facto standard” for crypto.31  Following on the 
heels of bitcoin came a large number of “altcoins,” which were 
27. In essence, a consensus protocol ensures that only blocks that a sufficient number
of computers have accepted as legitimate are added to the chain.  The proof of work protocol 
depends on computers serving as nodes in the network verifying the legitimacy of the trans-
actions in the block, solving a complicated mathematical puzzle, and sending the solution 
for that block to other nodes, which then verify the solution, with the result that the verified 
block is then added to the chain.  Nodes that work at solving the puzzle are said to be miners. 
This is how bitcoin mining works, and the node that delivers the first solution for each block 
on the bitcoin blockchain is awarded a number of bitcoins.  See generally Goforth, supra 
note 12.   
For a more detailed discussion of consensus protocols for decentralized networks, see Ameer 
Rosic, Basic Primer: Blockchain Consensus Protocol, BLOCKGEEKS, 
[https://perma.cc/8RT9-MB2H]. 
28. See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN,
[https://perma.cc/GHP2-S4PY]. 
29. As of October 1, 2019, the total capitalization of bitcoin was almost $150 billion.
Historical Data for Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP, [https://perma.cc/PWC4-M5BP].  For data 
for the month ending October 1, 2019, see Historical Data for Bitcoin, COINMARKETCAP, 
[https://perma.cc/7RQ5-FNZW]. 
30. See Nakamoto, supra note 28.
31. Sajalali, The Six Most Important Cryptocurrencies Other Than Bitcoins, STEEMIT,
[https://perma.cc/KR6M-PH6B]. While bitcoin may be the most influential, it was not the 
first attempt to create digital currency with an encryption-secured ledger.  See Bernard Marr, 
A Short History of Bitcoin and Crypto Currency Everyone Should Read, FORBES (Dec. 6, 
2017), [https://perma.cc/WGF7-Y427] (offering both B-Money and Bit Gold as examples of 
formulations that were never fully developed). 
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other cryptoassets also designed to be alternatives to fiat.32  After 
the initial wave of altcoins, there have been a growing number of 
cryptoassets designed to serve functions other than or in addition 
to being a replacement for fiat currencies.33 
For example, utilizing smart contracts imbedded into a par-
ticular software protocol,34 cryptoassets can be designed to pro-
vide a wide range of functionality, such as offering specific appli-
cations for particular platforms; serving as developer tools; 
providing a means for sharing data; improving protocols for es-
tablishing authenticity; and/or increasing privacy and sover-
eignty.35 
One of the universal attributes of all of these forms of crypto 
is the lack of any tangible item that exists outside of the block-
chain.  Cryptoassets are really nothing more than numeric entries 
on the digital ledger, and as such, they can be said to “exist” any-
where and everywhere there is a computer on which the applica-
ble digital ledger is stored.  This necessarily means that bitcoin 
and every other cryptoasset is, as was intended, global in nature.36  
32. Altcoins tend to promote themselves as being “better” than bitcoin in some respect.
For a general description of some of the most popular altcoins, see generally Mary Ann Cal-
lahan, Bitcoin or Altcoins: What Should You Invest in?, FXEMPIRE, [https://perma.cc/5GM9-
EL5D]. This is not to say that bitcoin is universally applauded.  The vice-chairman of Warren 
Buffett’s investment firm, Berkshire Hathaway, has said it is “totally asinine,” and a “nox-
ious poison.”  Julia Kollewe, Bitcoin Is ‘Noxious Poison’, Says Warren Buffett’s Investment 
Chief, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 15, 2018), [https://perma.cc/DN4B-GKVY]. 
33. This was the advent of so-called “utility tokens,” a form of cryptoasset specifically
designed with functionality beyond serving as a currency substitute in mind.  For a descrip-
tion of how utility tokens might function, see SFOX, What Are Utility Tokens, and How Will 
They Be Regulated?, MEDIUM (Dec. 28, 2018), [https://perma.cc/8VLA-BZ42]. 
34. A smart contract is a software protocol that executes the terms of a transaction that
takes place on a blockchain.  See generally Ameer Rosic, Smart Contracts: The Blockchain 
Technology That Will Replace Lawyers, BLOCKGEEKS, [https://perma.cc/D723-FE8U].Nick 
Szabo is generally credited with coining the phrase “smart contract” in 1996, prior to the 
advent of bitcoin.  See Magazzeni et al., supra note 23. 
35. Goforth, supra note 12, at 57 n.45 (citing Tokens, Cryptocurrencies & Other Cryp-
toassets, BLOCKCHAIN HUB, [https://perma.cc/349B-FSNA]). 
36. “Bitcoin and other crypto-currencies . . . can be accessed on computers throughout
the world, not just in modern economies, but also through exchanges and other peer-to-peer 
networks.”  Ed Howden, The Crypto-Currency Conundrum: Regulating an Uncertain Fu-
ture, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 741, 743-44 (2015).  As another commentator noted, crypto 
“is, by design, a borderless medium of exchange.”  Jacob Hamburger, Bitcoins vs. State 
Money Transmission Laws: Protecting Consumers or Hindering Innovation, 11 J.L. ECON. 
& POL’Y 229, 241 (2015) (speaking particularly about bitcoins) (internal quotations omit-
ted).  
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Pinpointing where an asset is “located” is an impossible and 
meaningless task.  Moreover, the internet allows businesses to in-
teract with customers from anywhere in the world,37 often on an 
anonymous or pseudonymous basis. 
So when and where are crypto-businesses treated as money 
transmitters?  Remember that bitcoin and all of the initial altcoins 
were specifically designed to replace fiat and were originally all 
referred to as cryptocurrencies.  Iit is therefore not surprising that 
regulatory authorities have been conditioned to treat crypto as 
“virtual currency.”  They are therefore predisposed to regulate 
businesses that facilitate transmission of crypto as money trans-
mitters.  
In order to reach every kind of business that looks like it 
might serve a payments processing or currency transmission func-
tion, money transmitter statutes are often broadly worded and 
broadly interpreted.  This was seen as necessary in order to re-
spond to the policy considerations that the regulatory regimes are 
designed to address.38  The result of this is that crypto businesses 
in the United States find themselves subject to a large number of 
money transmission regulations, all designed to further legitimate 
interests.39  The question is whether the existing paradigm strikes 
the right balance between the needs of innovators and entrepre-
neurs (and their customers), and the needs of regulators.  To an-
swer this inquiry, it is essential to start with a consideration of the 
policy justifications and objectives that the existing regulations 
are intended to address.  
III.  WHY ARE MONEY TRANSMITTERS
REGULATED? 
While it might be convenient if there was consistency in the 
public policies that have driven the regulation of money 
37. It may not even be possible for a business to know with certainty where customers
are located, if they conceal their identities and locations by (for example) spoofing IP ad-
dresses and lying on applications.  See Mauro Conti et al., A Survey on Security and Privacy 
Issues of Bitcoin, IEEE (Dec. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/3CEF-7FP2]. 
38. See supra note 13 for the breadth of federal and state definitions of virtual currency.
See infra Part II of this Article for a discussion of the policy considerations that support the 
regulation of money services businesses such as money transmitters.   
39. See infra Part III of this Article for a discussion of some of these regulations and
the interests they seek to further. 
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transmitters, the reality is that there are range of considerations at 
play.  There has long been a divide between the reasons that the 
federal government seeks to regulate such businesses and the pur-
poses behind state regulation.  This might not create insurmount-
able problems for money transmitters, except that states vary con-
siderably in what they are attempting to accomplish with their 
regulations, and then in how they have gone about furthering 
those objectives.  The following material in this Part considers 
first the public policies behind federal regulation of money trans-
mitters and then looks at the objectives that have driven state law. 
A. Federal Policies
When it comes to regulating businesses involved in the pro-
vision of money services, including money transmitters, the pri-
mary regulatory authority at the federal level is the Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), a bureau of the Treas-
ury Department.40  Its authority comes from the Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA), as that Act has been amended over the years.41  Pursuant 
to authority granted in the BSA, FinCEN’s mission42 focuses on 
40. FinCEN was established by Treasury Order 105-08 on April 25, 1990.  After the
adoption of the PATRIOT Act of 2001, FinCEN was official made a bureau within the Treas-
ury Department.  See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, TREASURY ORDER 180-01 (2002).  This is 
now reflected in 31 U.S.C. § 310(a), which confirms FinCEN as “a bureau in the Department 
of the Treasury.”  The PATRIOT Act is more formally known as the Uniting and Strength-
ening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 301-77, 115 Stat. 272, 296-342 (2001). 
41. The formal name for this act is The Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of
Currency and Foreign Transactions Act of 1970, although it is generally referred to as the 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA in this Article).  As amended, it is found in Titles I and II of Public 
Law 91–508, and is codified at 12 U.S.C. §1829b, 12 U.S.C. 1951–1959, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 
5311–5314 and 5316–5332.  Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114-24 (1970) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 31 U.S.C.). 
42. As explained on the FinCEN website, the bureau:
exercises regulatory functions primarily under the Currency and Financial Trans-
actions Reporting Act of 1970, as amended by Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 and other legislation, which legislative framework is commonly referred
to as the “Bank Secrecy Act” (BSA).  The BSA is the nation’s first and most
comprehensive Federal anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing
(AML/CFT) statute.  In brief, the BSA authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to
issue regulations requiring banks and other financial institutions to take a number
of precautions against financial crime . . . . 
What We Do, FINCEN, [https://perma.cc/UVC4-PDYM].  FinCEN’s stated mission is “to 
safeguard the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering, and promote na-
tional security through the strategic use of financial authorities and the collection, analysis, 
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the prevention of money laundering43 and funding of illegal activ-
ities, particularly the drug trade and more recently, terrorism.44  
Not surprisingly, FinCEN’s money transmitter regulations are di-
rected primarily towards solving these problems. 
According to the federal government (as set forth on the Fin-
CEN website), “[m]oney laundering is the process of making il-
legally-gained proceeds (i.e. ‘dirty money’) appear legal (i.e. 
‘clean’).”45  Money laundering became a significant focus of law 
enforcement efforts during the 1970s, and it increased in priority 
throughout the 1980s.46  There was a widespread perception that 
massive amounts of money were being funneled into and out of 
the narcotics trade in particular.47  Thus, anti-money laundering 
(AML) requirements were geared toward combatting both tradi-
tional money laundering and also “reverse” laundering, where 
clean money was funneled into illegal activities.48  Since that 
time, problems associated with money laundering and the financ-
ing of criminal and terrorist activities have been a topic of 
and dissemination of financial intelligence.”  Mission, FINCEN, [https://perma.cc/K7LF-
FJJ5].  
43. As explained by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, money-laundering
continues to be a major threat to the American financial system: 
Criminals have long used money-laundering schemes to conceal or “clean” the 
source of fraudulently obtained or stolen funds.  Money laundering poses signifi-
cant risks to the safety and soundness of the U.S. financial industry.  With the 
advent of terrorists who employ money-laundering techniques to fund their oper-
ations, the risk expands to encompass the safety and security of the nation. 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), U.S. DEPT. TREAS., 
[https://perma.cc/JV52-UW6Z]. 
44. The Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 301-77, 115 Stat. 272, 296-342 (2001), spe-
cifically expanded the reach of the BSA to include counter-terrorism financing initiatives. 
See History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FINCEN, [https://perma.cc/UA7Y-Y8MF]. 
45. Id.
46. The history of efforts designed to combat money laundering in the U.S. is described
briefly in Ann Eberhardt, History and Enforcement of Anti-Money Laundering Laws in the 
U.S., CLAIMS JOURNAL (Jan. 8, 2018), [https://perma.cc/ZW6J-VD7Z].  See also Alina Lau-
mann, The History of Anti-Money Laundering — Events, Regulations, and Adaptations in
the United States, KROLL (July 16, 2019), [https://perma.cc/65Q2-47ML].
47. See Sabrina Adamoli, Money laundering, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Feb. 13, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/K62D-9GYC] (discussing both the international efforts to target profits of 
unlawful activities as a way of combating drug trafficking, and the implementation of these 
efforts in the United States). 
48. Douglas A. Leff, Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture: Taking the Profit Out
of Crime, 55 U.S. ATT’Y’S BULL. 36, Nov. 2007, at 42-43 (discussing use of 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a)(2)(A) to combat non-terrorism reverse money laundering).  
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perennial concern for federal legislators.  This has resulted in 
many federal laws seeking to address these problems.49  
Although there were a number of legislative enactments 
throughout the 1990s, it was the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 (the 
Patriot Act),50 enacted in the wake of the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks that most significantly expanded AML legislation 
in the United States. The Patriot Act added new record-keeping 
requirements, expanded reporting and record-keeping require-
ments to a variety of nonbank financial institutions, such as bro-
ker-dealers and insurance companies, and broadened the reach of 
the already expansive money-laundering laws.51  These require-
ments apply, among other things, to money transmitters.  Under 
its expanded provisions, the BSA authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury to issue regulations requiring financial institutions to 
keep records and file reports necessary to carry out its AML and 
counter terrorism funding (CTF) missions.52  This authority has 
been delegated to FinCEN.53  
These developments explain why the overwhelming empha-
sis on money transmitter regulation at the federal level has been 
on preventing money laundering and the funding of other criminal 
behavior.  Only recently has the federal government evidenced 
49. The list of federal acts addressing money laundering and funding of illegal activi-
ties includes all of the following: 
• Bank Secrecy Act (1970) (generally referred to as the BSA)
• Money Laundering Control Act (1986)
• Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
• Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act (1992)
• Money Laundering Suppression Act (1994)
• Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act (1998)
• Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (known as the USA
PATRIOT Act or simply the Patriot Act)
• Intelligence Reform & Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
See Laumann, supra note 46. 
50. The Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 301-77, 115 Stat. 272, 296-342 (2001).
51. The breadth of the reporting and oversight requirements is so great that many crit-
icisms have been leveled at the Patriot Act notwithstanding general sympathy with the need 
to address money laundering and funding of terrorism.  See, e.g., Susan Nevelow Mart, The 
Chains of the Constitution and Legal Process in the Library: A Post-USA Patriot Reauthor-
ization Act Assessment, 33 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 435 (2008). 
52. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 5318(h) (2014).
53. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, TREASURY ORDER 180–01 (2002).
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growing concern over the need to protect customers in the money 
transmitter context.54 
B. State Concerns
States have taken a variety of different approaches to the reg-
ulation of money transmitters, in large measure because they are 
concerned with different risks.  While FinCEN is focused on pre-
venting money laundering and the funding of criminal enter-
prises, state law is often predicated on a much broader, sometimes 
amorphous or unarticulated, set of policy considerations.  
In some states, the policies behind state money transmitter 
laws are clear.  For example, some jurisdictions have adopted ex-
plicit statements of legislative objectives as part of their money 
transmitter acts.  California’s money transmission act includes a 
specific legislative declaration that the purpose of the act is “[t]o 
protect the interests of consumers of money transmission busi-
nesses in this state, to maintain public confidence in financial 
54. See Brian Knight, Federalism and Federalization on the Fintech Frontier, 20
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 155 (2017) (noting that “the federal government, through the 
CFPB (the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau), is expressing increased interest in con-
sumer protection regarding the money transmission context”)  The CFPB was created on 
July 2010, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. 
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Creating the Consumer Bureau, CFPB, 
[https://perma.cc/MF5Q-B8NB]. 
In general terms “Dodd-Frank authorizes the CFPB to take action against institutions 
engaged in unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices or that otherwise violate federal 
consumer financial laws.”  Sidley Austin LLP, U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau’s Principles for Data Aggregation Services Could Have Broad Implications 3 (Nov. 9, 
2017), [https://perma.cc/4Q6J-3M5X].  Pursuant to this authority, in 2016, the CFPB took 
action again Dwolla, Inc., an online payment platform that had deceived consumers about its 
data security practices.  See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against Dwolla 
for Misrepresenting Data Security Practices, CFPB (Mar. 2, 2016), [https://perma.cc/7E8G-
Q8T9] (use the screenshot view).  The CFPB has continued to monitor money transmitters 
with a view to protecting consumers, as indicated in its August 27, 2019 settlement with 
Maxitransfers Corporation.  Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau Settles with Maxitransfers Corporation, CFPB (Aug. 27, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/SR3E-WCYH] (use screenshot view).  
Keep in mind, however, that there are other federal regulatory authorities that have 
specific missions designed to protect members of the public.  Both the Securities and Ex-
change Commissions (SEC) and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) rec-
ognize the need to protect the public as overarching policy mandates.  See, e.g., What We 
Do, SEC, [https://perma.cc/58GU-X86Q] (listing the need “to protect investors” first among 
its priorities); Mission & Responsibilities, CFTC, [https://perma.cc/RK3L-2PKW] (explic-
itly setting out the goal of lowering the risks of futures and swaps markets to “the public”).  
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institutions doing business in this state, and to preserve the health, 
safety, and general welfare of the people of this state . . . .”55  Sim-
ilarly, the legislative declaration in Colorado’s Money Transmit-
ters Act states that it is “imperative that the integrity, experience, 
and financial responsibility and reliability of those engaged in the 
various types of businesses dealing in the instruments be above 
reproach . . . [i]n order that the people of this state may be safe-
guarded from default in the payment of these instruments.”56  The 
Kentucky Money Transmitters Act of 2006 also includes an ex-
press statement about the underlying legislative objectives:  
It is the intent of the General Assembly to establish a state 
system of licensure and regulation to ensure the safe and 
sound operation of money transmission to ensure that this 
business is not used for criminal purposes, to promote confi-
dence in the state’s financial system, and to protect the public 
interest.57  
New York includes a number of different policy objectives in its 
Financial Services Laws, which applies to money transmitters.58  
These include fostering “the growth of the financial industry in 
New York,” “protect[ing] users of financial products . . . from fi-
nancial impaired or insolvent providers of such services,” and 
“eliminat[ing] financial fraud.”59 
Other states have statutes that lack a specific statement of 
legislative intent, but the general objectives and guiding policies 
behind the laws may be gleaned from other sources.  For example, 
a dozen jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Money Services 
Act (UMSA).60  The ULC, which drafted the UMSA, describes it 
55. CAL. FIN. CODE § 2001(d) (West 2015).
56. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-110-102 (2017).
57. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.11-067 (West 2006).
58. N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 201(b)(1)-(7) (McKinney 2011).
59. N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 201(b)(1), (4), (6) (McKinney 2011).
60. UNIF. MONEY SERV. ACT prefatory note, pt. A (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004) [here-
inafter UMSA] (commenting on the goal of creating a uniform system of regulation to serve 
as a larger deterrent to money laundering and to assist law enforcement generally). The 
UMSA, with comments, can be downloaded from the ULC website at Money Services Act, 
UNIF. LAW COMM’N, [https://perma.cc/8ES7-DG7T]. Originally promulgated in 2000, the 
act was amended in 2004.  The text of the amendments as approved at the ULC’s 2004 annual 
meeting may be downloaded from the ULC website at Money Services Act: Committee Ar-
chive, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, [https://perma.cc/8ES7-DG7T].  
As of the date this Article was written, Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, U.S. Virgin Islands, and 
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as a “safety and soundness law,” designed to promote uniformity 
while furthering the prevention and detection of money launder-
ing.61  While none of the UMSA’s provisions explicitly articulate 
these objectives, states enacting this statute are likely to have been 
concerned with the same issues that drove the ULC to propose the 
UMSA, regardless of whether they have explicitly adopted the 
UMSA’s prefatory note, which is where these objectives are set 
out.62  
In Minnesota, the title of the state act gives a fairly clear in-
dication of the legislative priorities.  That state’s statute is enti-
tled: “Money Transmission—Protection from Financial Abuse, 
Financial Exploitation, and Fraud—Requirements.”63  
In other jurisdictions, there may be other evidence of the 
goals behind money transmitter provisions.  For example, a report 
detailing the objectives of Florida’s money transmitter regula-
tions noted that Florida has traditionally been concerned with 
eliminating money laundering (a concern due to international 
drug trafficking activity in South Florida) and check-cashing 
businesses that operate as payday lenders.64  
On the other hand, there are also states where the underlying 
motives are unclear.  For example, both the Texas and Illinois 
statutes and regulations are silent as to why those jurisdictions 
have chosen to regulate money transmitters.65  Even in these 
cases, discussions with individual regulators may provide some 
insights into the probable goals of the legislature,66 although that 
is not necessarily true everywhere.  In very general terms, it ap-
pears that most states have a very strong interest in looking out 
Washington had all enacted the statute.  No pending legislation was mentioned, and the last 
enactments listed by the ULC occurred in 2016.  See Money Services Act, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, [https://perma.cc/M5G7-AKHL] (listing each state that has adopted the Money 
Services Act along with the year it was enacted in each jurisdiction). 
61. See UMSA, supra note 60, at prefatory note, pt. A.
62. See id.
63. Money Transmission–Protection from Financial Abuse, Financial Exploitation,
and Fraud–Requirements, 2014 Md. Laws Ch. 421 (2014) (codified as amended at MD. 
CODE ANN., FIN. INST. §§ 12-401 (West 2014)). 
64. See FLA. S. REP. NO. 2008-101, COMM. ON BANKING & INS., Regulation of Money
Services Businesses, at 1 (2007), [https://perma.cc/8FG4-UD6W]. 
65. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.002 (West 2019); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 657/5
(2004). 
66. See, e.g., Lo, supra note 6, at 117.
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for the interests of consumers located in the state, with many 
states also expressing concerns about issues such as money laun-
dering and other criminal activities.  
Given the breadth of these concerns, how do the federal and 
state governments go about defining the kinds of businesses that 
need to be regulated in order to achieve their varied policy objec-
tives?  The following material looks first at how federal law de-
termines what businesses are to be regulated as money transmit-
ters, and then considers how states have approached this question. 
IV.  WHAT IS A “MONEY TRANSMITTER” UNDER
FEDERAL LAW? 
At the federal level, money transmitters are regulated pursu-
ant to authority granted in the BSA. While the title of the BSA 
might lead one to believe that its provisions apply to “banks,” in 
fact it includes requirements applicable to a wide range of “finan-
cial institutions.”  The BSA defines the term ‘‘financial institu-
tion’’ to include, among other things, “any person who engages 
as a business in the transmission of funds . . . .”67  The businesses 
included within this definition are generally referred to as money 
services businesses (MSBs),68 and they specifically include any-
one functioning as a money transmitter.69  FinCEN’s regulations 
further explain that “money transmitter” includes anyone who 
“provides money transmission services.”70  In turn, “money trans-
mission services” is defined to mean “the acceptance of currency, 
funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one person 
and the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that 
67. “Financial Institution” is defined generally in title 18, which covers crimes and
criminal procedure generally, as including banks, depository institutions, and similar organ-
izations.  See 18 U.S.C. § 20 (2009).  The BSA, however, has its own definition of financial 
institution, so that for its purposes, that term includes any: 
licensed sender of money or any other person who engages as a business in the 
transmission of funds, including any person who engages as a business in an in-
formal money transfer system or any network of people who engage as a business 
in facilitating the transfer of money domestically or internationally outside of the 
conventional financial institutions system. 
31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(R) (2004). 
68. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff) (2014).
69. See 2011 Regulations, supra note 13.
70. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5).
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substitutes for currency to another location or person by any 
means.”71 
Under these definitions, a money transmitter must be doing 
business on behalf of one or more third parties.  As an example 
of an activity that does not involve money transmission because 
there was no third party involved, FinCEN concluded in 2005 that 
a business set up to wire the founder’s personal funds to Columbia 
for investment purposes was not a “money transmitter.”72  
In addition, the regulations list six different kinds of activi-
ties that will not be enough to cause a person to be subject to 
money transmitter requirements: 
1. Merely providing “delivery, communication, or network
access services . . . to support money transmission ser-
vices”;
2. “Act[ing] as a payment processor to facilitate the pur-
chase of, or payment for [goods or services] through a
clearance and settlement system by agreement with the
creditor or seller”;
3. “Operat[ing] a clearance and settlement system or other-
wise act[ing] as an intermediary solely between BSA
regulated institutions”;
4. Acting solely as a custodian and “physically
transport[ing] currency” or other value that substitutes
for currency “as a person primarily engaged in such busi-
ness”, on behalf of a customer to an account owned by
the same customer at a financial institution;
5. “Provid[ing] prepaid access”; or
6. Accepting and transmitting funds “integral to the sale of
goods or . . . services, other than money transmission
services.” 73
Even with these limitations, the federal definition is quite broad.  
A business can be a money transmitter subject to FinCEN regula-
tions regardless of where it is physically located, whether or not 
the money transmission activities are conducted on a regular ba-
sis, or whether operations are conducted through an organized 
71. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A).
72. FinCEN Ruling 2005-4 – Definition of Money Services Business (“Doing Busi-
ness” as a Money Services Business), FINCEN (July 1, 2005), [https://perma.cc/5DW7-
VUY6]. 
73. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(A)-(F).
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entity.74  FinCEN’s MSB requirements will apply whenever 
money transmission activities are being conducted in the United 
States, in whole or in substantial part, and this can be satisfied 
with a showing that the money transmitter maintains “any agent, 
agency, branch, or office within the United States.”75  
In addition, although some other money services businesses 
have a minimum threshold that they must meet before they are 
subjected to FinCEN’s regulatory requirements,76 the federal def-
inition of money transmitter does not include a minimum activity 
level.  It does, however, limit applicability of the MSB require-
ments so that the rules will not apply to banks, 77 a natural person 
who engages in the activities only “on an infrequent basis and not 
for gain or profit,”78 or any person registered with, and function-
ally regulated or examined by, the SEC or the CFTC.79  Note that 
this last exclusion does not apply to publicly held companies 
simply because they have issued one or more classes of securities 
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,80 or to an 
issuer conducting an offering registered under the Securities Act 
of 1933.81  Registration of securities in and of itself does not sub-
ject the issuer to the SEC’s control aside from imposing reporting, 
accounting, and other requirements designed to ensure disclosure 
of material information.82  For this reason, “these entities are not 
intended to be excluded from the rule’s definition of money 
74. STEVEN MARK LEVY, FED. MONEY LAUNDERING § 18.04 (2d Ed. 2019 Supp., As-
pen). 
75. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff).
76. Money transmitters are the only form of MSB that are subject to regulation even if
they do not engage in more than $1000 in such activities in any day.  See BANK COMPL. 
GUIDE ¶ 101-948 (2011), Westlaw 12877955. 
77. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(8)(i).
78. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(8)(iii).
79. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(8)(ii).
80. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “‘34 Act”) is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
78a-78qq (1934).  The ‘34 Act imposes a registration requirement in order for market pro-
fessionals to use the services of a national exchange. The requirements are set out in § 12 of 
the ‘34 Act, as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2015). 
81. The Securities Act of 1933 (the “‘33 Act”) is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
The registration requirement appears in section 5 of the ‘33 Act, as codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
77e (2012). 
82. 64 FED. REG. 45,438, 45,446 (Aug. 20, 1999).
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services businesses because the Commission neither regulates nor 
examines the business activities of those companies.”83 
FinCEN’s first major guidance on how its money transmitter 
requirements should be applied to crypto-based businesses came 
in 2013 (the 2013 Guidance), making the Bureau one of the ear-
liest regulators to address cryptoassets.84  However, the ground-
work for FinCEN’s current approach was actually laid in 2011, 
when FinCEN finalized a rule that expanded the meaning of the 
phrase “money transmission services” to include “the acceptance 
of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency 
from one person and the transmission of currency, funds, or other 
value that substitutes for currency to another location or person 
by any means.”85  While not explicitly mentioning crypto or “vir-
tual currency,” this expansion of money transmission to cover 
“other value that substitutes for currency” provided the primary 
basis for applying AML requirements to actors in the crypto 
space.86 
The 2013 Guidance87 applies only to crypto convertible into 
fiat currency, either directly or indirectly, and divides persons in-
volved with such cryptoassets into three categories: users, admin-
istrators, and exchangers.88  Users are defined as persons who ob-
tain the currency “to purchase real or virtual goods . . . .”89  Users 
are not regulated as money transmitters.90 
As for the other two categories, the 2013 Guidance stated: 
An administrator or exchanger that (1) accepts and transmits 
a convertible virtual currency or (2) buys or sells convertible 
virtual currency for any reason is a money transmitter under 
FinCEN’s regulations . . . . FinCEN’s regulations define the 
term “money transmitter” as a person that provides money 
transmission services, or any other person engaged in the 
transfer of funds.  The term “money transmission services” 
means “the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that 
83. Id.
84. 2013 GUIDANCE, supra note 13.
85. 2011 Regulations, supra note 13.
86. Id. at 43,592.
87. 2013 GUIDANCE, supra note 13.
88. Id. at n. 6 and accompanying text.
89. 2013 GUIDANCE, supra note 13.
90. Id.
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substitutes for currency from one person and the transmis-
sion of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for 
currency to another location or person by any means.” 
The definition of a money transmitter does not differentiate 
between real currencies and convertible virtual currencies.91 
The federal determination of who is a money transmitter is thus 
very inclusive, turning on the very broad definition of money 
transmission services, which specifically includes not only cur-
rency and funds, but also other value that substitutes for cur-
rency.92 
V.  WHAT IS A “MONEY TRANSMITTER”
UNDER STATE LAW? 
When it comes to the definition of money transmission under 
state law, there is considerable variation, both in the wording of 
the state statutes and in the determination of whether the applica-
ble statutory language applies to virtual currencies.  
Prior to the advent of cryptoassets, there was already consid-
erable variation in state approaches.  Many state statutes were 
broad in their approach, covering not only the transmission of fiat 
currency but also other items of “monetary value,” or “substi-
tutes” for currency.  For example, the UMSA93 defines money 
transmission as the “selling or issuing payment instruments, 
stored value, or receiving money or monetary value for transmis-
sion.  The term does not include the provision solely of delivery, 
online or telecommunications services, or network access.”94  A 
comment to this section specifically acknowledges that this defi-
nition “subsumes several activities or functions,” and notes that 
“[t]he grouping of funds transmission and the sale or issuance of 
payment instruments and stored value is consistent with existing 
state practice.”95  As of the date this Article was written, Alaska, 
Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, New Mexico, North Carolina, Puerto 
91. Id.
92. See supra note 85.
93. UMSA, supra note 60, at prefatory note, pt. A
94. Id. at § 102(14).
95. Id. at § 102, cmt. 9.
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Rico, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, U.S. Virgin Islands, and 
Washington have versions of the UMSA.96  
Other states have alternative language that is just as broad.  
For example, Georgia’s statute says:  
“Money transmission,” “transmit money,” or “transmission 
of money” means engaging in the business of receiving 
money or monetary value for transmission or transmitting 
money or monetary value within the United States or to lo-
cations abroad by any and all means, including, but not lim-
ited to, an order, wire, facsimile, or electronic transfer.97 
In Maryland, “money transmission” is defined as “the business of 
selling or issuing payment instruments or stored value devices, or 
receiving money or monetary value, for transmission to a location 
within or outside the United States by any means, including elec-
tronically or through the Internet.”98  Other states use similar lan-
guage in their definitions.99 
At the other end of the spectrum are the two states that have 
chosen not to regulate domestic money transmitters.  Montana has 
no money transmission statute at all, and Massachusetts regulates 
only foreign money transmitters, having no provisions that apply 
to domestic businesses.100  
Also complicating the picture are jurisdictions like Nevada, 
where there is a money transmission statute that lacks any helpful 
definitions, leaving the interpretation and breadth of the statutory 
requirements for the courts to determine.101 
There are some common themes in the definitions of money 
transmitters or money transmission businesses employed by most 
states.  Generally speaking, there are few explicit limitations on 
what kind of business can be regulated as a money transmitter.  
96. See UMSA, supra note 60.  No pending legislation was mentioned, and the last
enactments listed by the ULC occurred in 2016. 
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-680(13) (2016) (emphasis added).  Closed loop transactions
are exempted from this otherwise expansive definition. 
98. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 12-401(m)(1) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
99. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §487.1003(c) (2019) (defining “money transmission
services” as “selling or issuing payment instruments or . . . prepaid access devices or vehicles 
or receiving money or monetary value for transmission”) (emphasis added). 
100. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 169, §§ 1-16 (2020).
101. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 671.010 (1985) (regulating the business of transmitting
money or credits without providing a statutory definition of money transmission or any other 
guidance on what this entails).  See generally NEV. ADMIN. CODE §§ 671.005-.100 (2016). 
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Most statutes do not include any minimum activity threshold to 
trigger the statute, do not require the business to focus on con-
sumer-oriented services, and do not seem concerned about the 
method used to accomplish the transmission of value.102  In addi-
tion, most statutes are not limited by their terms to “money,” alt-
hough this does not automatically mean that crypto-based busi-
nesses will be covered by the state requirements.103  
To borrow a pun based on terminology common in the 
crypto space, there is a lack of consensus about how crypto should 
fit into the regulatory regime.104  This Article does not purport to 
provide an exhaustive listing of the different state approaches to 
the issue of whether crypto businesses can be money transmitters.  
The following material does, however, describe enough variation 
to provide a basis for understanding the difficulty that a crypto-
based enterprise is likely to have if it intends to do business in the 
United States. 
A. States that Have no Clear or no Definitive Guidance
There are a number of states that have yet to issue official
guidance on the issue of whether crypto-based businesses fit 
within the state’s money transmitter provisions or where the ex-
isting guidance is ambiguous.  As of the date this was written, the 
list of states with no published guidance and a money transmitter 
statue that does not clearly mention crypto or virtual currency in-
cludes all of the following: Arizona, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, 
102. To illustrate this, consider Idaho’s statute which covers transmission “by any and
all means including, but not limited to, payment instrument, wire, facsimile or electronic 
transfer.”  IDAHO CODE § 26-2902(11) (1994).  Illinois uses the same language, although its 
official statute is formatted differently.  205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 657/5 (2004).  Kansas’ pro-
vision covers transmission “by wire, facsimile, electronic means or any other means, except 
that money transmission does not include currency exchange where no transmission of 
money occurs . . . .”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-508(h) (2017); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
17:15C-2 (West 1998) (covering “transmission . . . by any and all means, including but not 
limited to payment instrument, wire, facsimile, electronic transfer, or otherwise for a fee, 
commission or other benefit”). 
103. See infra notes 105-79 and accompanying text for a consideration of the range of
state reactions to this question. 
104. Matthew E. Kohen & Justin S. Wales, State Regulations on Virtual Currency and
Blockchain Technologies, CARLTON FIELDS (Aug. 29, 2019), [https://perma.cc/AK2D-
HRD6].  
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Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and West Virginia.105 
Some states have no official guidance, but there is some in-
dication of how regulators intend to apply the state laws.  In Ar-
kansas, for example, the state Securities Department has issued 
no action letters in response to inquiries from crypto-based busi-
nesses, determining that the Securities Department will not rec-
ommend that the businesses be penalized for failing to procure 
money transmitter licenses.106  Unfortunately, these opinion let-
ters may not be relied upon by anyone other than the persons to 
whom they are directed, although they do provide an indication 
of how the state currently views its money transmitter statute. 
Similarly, there is no official guidance in Wisconsin, but that 
state has refused to issue money transmitter licenses to virtual cur-
rency businesses and requires an agreement, if a company deals 
in virtual currency, stating that the company will not use virtual 
currency to transmit money.107  
Idaho’s money transmitter statute does not define virtual cur-
rency or include monetary value,108 and there are no official reg-
ulations that consider whether crypto-based businesses are sub-
ject to its requirements.  However, the Idaho Department of 
Finance, which administers the state money transmitters act, has 
opined that a crypto exchange that accepts legal tender for later 
delivery to a third party in connection with the purchase of crypto 
is a money transmitter.109  On the other hand, the Department has 
also issued several “No Action & Opinion Letters” on money 
105. See id.  This list comes in part from the Kohen & Wales article, although online
searches confirm the lack of official guidance in these jurisdictions as of September 2019. 
106. See, e.g., CEX.IO LTD, Ark. Sec. Dep’t No-Action Letter No. 18-NA-0006 (July
18, 2018), [https://perma.cc/C3UG-YUPB] (agreeing that a virtual currency purchase and 
sale and exchange product should not need a license under the state’s Uniform Money Ser-
vices Act). 
107. See Sellers of Checks, STATE OF WIS. DEP’T OF FIN. INST.,
[https://perma.cc/FB33-VHNY] (stating that the law does not currently give the Department 
authority to regulate virtual currency, but this may be changed at any time by new regulations 
or interpretations). 
108. IDAHO CODE § 26-2902 (1994).
109. Idaho Money Transmitters Section, IDAHO DEP’T OF FIN., 
[https://perma.cc/2ZL3-3YX3] (“If you act as a virtual/digital currency exchanger and accept 
legal tender (e.g., government backed/issued ‘fiat’ currencies) for later delivery to a third 
party in association with the purchase of a virtual currency, then you must be licensed as a 
money transmitter with the Department of Finance.”). 
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transmitters addressing how the state’s money transmission laws 
apply to virtual currency operations.110  A typical letter was posted 
July 5, 2019.  In it, the Department wrote, “[a]n exchanger that 
sells its own inventory of virtual currency is generally not consid-
ered a money transmitter . . . [but] an exchanger that holds cus-
tomer funds while arranging a satisfactory buy/sell order with a 
third party, and transmits the virtual currency . . . between buyer 
and seller, will typically be considered  . . . a money transmitter 
. . . .”111  This letter does not clarify the meaning of “customer 
funds.”  Under the prior guidance, if the funds are fiat currency, 
the exchange will be a money transmitter.112  The question of what 
happens if an exchange only deals in various forms of crypto is-
sued by others is not specifically addressed, leaving open the 
question of how broadly the state might apply its money transmit-
ter requirements. 
On the other hand, a number of states have clearly indicated 
how they intend to apply their money transmitter requirements. 
The clearest guidance is available in those states that have new 
legislation specifically dealing with crypto.  A number of juris-
dictions have amended their state statutes to clarify this issue, but 
the approaches that these states have taken vary widely. 
B. States with New Provisions Exempting Crypto
Businesses 
In 2017, New Hampshire amended its money transmitter 
statute to exempt “[p]ersons who engage in the business of selling 
or issuing payment instruments or stored value solely in the form 
of convertible virtual currency or receive convertible virtual cur-
rency for transmission to another location.”113  Wyoming has sim-
ilarly exempted virtual currency businesses from its money trans-
mitter statutes,114 a decision that is not surprising for the state that 
110. See Money Transmitters, IDAHO DEP’T OF FIN., [https://perma.cc/U2Q2-YGMQ].
111. Idaho Dept. of Fin. No-Action Letter Re: Idaho Money Transmitter License In-
quiry (July 5, 2019), [https://perma.cc/GKY9-3JM5]. 
112. See id.
113. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 399-G:3(VI-a) (2017).
114. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-22-104(a)(vi) (2020) (specifying that the act shall not ap-
ply to “[b]uying, selling, issuing, or taking custody of payment instruments or stored value 
in the form of virtual currency or receiving virtual currency for transmission to a location 
within or outside the United States by any means”). 
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is regarded as being the most pro-crypto jurisdiction in the coun-
try.115 
Most states that have enacted new provisions have gone in 
the other direction, specifically amending their statutes so that 
they clearly include crypto within the ambit of money transmis-
sion. 
C. States with New Provisions Regulating Crypto
Effective August 2017, the Alabama Monetary Transmis-
sion Act defines “monetary value” as “[a] medium of exchange, 
including virtual or fiat currencies, whether or not redeemable in 
money.”116  The act therefore requires every person engaging in 
the business of monetary transmission in Alabama (including the 
receipt of virtual currency for transmission) to obtain a license 
from the state.117  North Carolina similarly expanded its act to de-
fine virtual currency traders as money transmitters and, as a result, 
requires they obtain a license.118  
In 2017, Vermont added “virtual currency” to the list of de-
fined terms in its money transmission act,119 although it appears 
that this did not mark a substantive change in the way the state 
interpreted its money transmitter requirements.120  Connecticut 
took similar action, amending its money transmitter act in 2018 
to add a specific definition of virtual currencies.121  To some 
115. Wyoming’s pro-crypto bent has been widely observed.  See, e.g., Gregory Barber,
The Newest Haven for Cryptocurrency Companies? Wyoming, WIRED (June 13, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/LMG8-XE9B]; Benjamin Bain, Wyoming Aims to Be America’s Crypto-
currency Capital, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 15, 2018), [https://perma.cc/C2LF-
KKKX]. 
116. ALA. CODE § 8-7A-2(8) (2017).
117. ALA. CODE § 8-7A-5(a).
118. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-208.42(13)(b) (2018).
119. Vermont’s Money Services Act defines “money transmission” to include “selling
or issuing” stored value and “receiving money or monetary value for transmission to a loca-
tion within or outside the United States.”  VT. STAT. ANN. 8, § 2500(9) (2019).  As used in 
the act, monetary value means a medium of exchange “whether or not redeemable in money.”  
VT. STAT. ANN. § 2500(6).  And as of 2017, “virtual currency” is defined as a “medium of 
exchange, unit of account, or a store of value” that can be exchanged for “money or other 
convertible virtual currency.”  VT. STAT. ANN. § 2500(13). 
120. See, e.g., Poloniex, LLC, Docket No. 19-006-B, 2019 WL 2491641 (Vt. Sec. Div.
May 22, 2019) (specifically noting that the state “always” interpreted its money transmitter 
act to cover virtual currency). 
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-596(18) (2018).
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extent, this was not necessary because, by October 1, 2017, Con-
necticut had already subjected any person “in the business of 
money transmission in this state by receiving, transmitting, stor-
ing or maintaining custody or control of virtual currency on behalf 
of another person” to regulation.122  Similarly, in 2017, Washing-
ton amended its money transmission statute, the Washington Uni-
form Money Services Act,123 to include virtual currencies.124  
“Money transmission” is now defined in that state as “receiving 
money or its equivalent value (equivalent value includes virtual 
currency) . . . .”125  Although the statutory language is new, the 
position taken is consistent with interim guidance that had been 
in effect in Washington since 2014.126  
Georgia has also amended its money transmitter act to add 
virtual currency.127  However, in the spring of 2016, the Georgia 
legislature authorized the state’s Department of Banking and Fi-
nance “to enact rules and regulations that apply solely to persons 
engaged in money transmission or the sale of payment instru-
ments involving virtual currency,”128 in order to “[f]oster the 
growth of businesses engaged in money transmission or the sale 
of payment instruments involving virtual currency in Georgia and 
spur state economic development.”129  This raises the possibility 
that the state might at some point exempt such businesses from 
typical money transmission requirements.  To date, this is not the 
direction the agency has taken, and on July 26, 2018, the Depart-
ment issued a cease and desist order to a crypto company, on the 
basis that it was engaging in unlicensed money transmission.130 
122. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-603(b) (2017) (requirement that the company have suf-
ficient minimum assets). 
123. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230 (2017).
124. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.010(30).
125. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.010(18).
126. Memorandum from Deborah Bortner, Dir. of the Div. of Consumer Serv.’s of the
Dep’t of Fin. Inst.’s of Wash. on Virtual Currency Activities Under the Uniform Money 
Services Act to Virtual Currency Companies Operating or Wishing to Operate in Washington 
State 1-2 (Dec. 8, 2014), [https://perma.cc/ZB5Y-J3SA] (providing interim regulatory guid-
ance).  
127. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-680(26) (2016).
128. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-690(b).
129. GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-690(b)(1).
130. Press Release, Ga. Dep’t. of Banking & Fin., Department of Banking and Finance
Orders CampBX, Bitcoin Trading Platform, to Cease and Desist (July 26, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/7BQZ-CB4Z]. 
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The state with the most notoriously aggressive regulation of 
crypto is New York.  In 2015, the New York State Department of 
Financial Services established a comprehensive regulatory frame-
work requiring businesses that engage in transactions involving 
any form of virtual currency to obtain a new license, called the 
“BitLicense,” from the state.131  There are a number of require-
ments that must be met before a business will be granted the li-
cense, including not only AML and cybersecurity policies, but 
also strict compliance and supervisory procedures.132  The re-
quirements are so onerous that there have been widespread re-
ports of crypto businesses “fleeing” the state.133  It is so difficult 
and time-consuming to comply with the regulations that when the 
state granted a new license in March 2019, the total number of 
BitLicenses in the state only reached a total of 18.134 
While legislation may be the most definitive way to deter-
mine whether virtual currency is covered by a state’s money 
transmitter laws, other forms of guidance are also possible.  
D. Interpretive Guidance Excluding Crypto Businesses
Alaska is one jurisdiction with no blockchain, cryptocur-
rency, or virtual currency references in the state statutes or regu-
lations.  However, the state’s Division of Banking and Services 
has issued guidance to the effect that it is not authorized to regu-
late virtual currencies as only transactions involving fiat curren-
cies are subject to the state’s money transmitter law.135  
131. See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS tit. 23, § 200 (2015); Sarah Jane
Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating Cryptocurrency 
Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. OF REG. 495, 536 (2015) (explaining that the “proposed 
framework for regulating cryptocurrency businesses [was] dubbed the ‘BitLicense’”); Press 
Release, N.Y. Dep’t. of Fin. Serv.’s, NY DFS Releases Proposed BitLicense Regulatory 
Framework for Virtual Currency Firms (July 17, 2014), [https://perma.cc/8N39-L4DL]. 
132. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS tit. 23, §§ 200.3, 200.4, 200.7, 200.15, 200.16
(2015). 
133. Daniel Roberts, Behind the “Exodus” of Bitcoin Startups from New York,
FORTUNE (Aug. 14, 2015), [https://perma.cc/G2BC-B5WZ]. 
134. See Jessica Klein, New York Just Granted Its 18th BitLicense, BREAKERMAG
(Mar. 28, 2019), [https://perma.cc/5KAV-EULG] (also noting that “[m]any of these compa-
nies had to wait a while between the time they applied for their BitLicenses and the time they 
were granted them. In May 2018, Fortune reported that Genesis Global Trading (the fifth 
BitLicense grantee) had to wait close to three years for approval.”) 
135. See Kohen & Wales, supra note 104.
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A number of other states where finance and money transmit-
ter laws do not mention virtual currencies or crypto have reached 
the same or similar conclusions.  For example, the Illinois Depart-
ment of Financial and Professional Regulation has issued guid-
ance concluding that virtual currencies are not “money” under the 
Illinois money transmitters act, and therefore “[a] person or entity 
engaged in the transmission of solely digital currencies, as de-
fined, would not be required to obtain a . . . license.”136  North 
Dakota’s Department of Financial Institutions has issued guid-
ance under that state’s law to the effect that: “The purchase, sale, 
or exchange of virtual currency does not in and of itself require a 
money transmitter license.”137  Tennessee takes the same position, 
having issued guidance explaining that it does not consider virtual 
currency to be money under its money transmitter act and there-
fore, no license is required.138  
Kansas is slightly more nuanced in its approach, although its 
approach is generally consistent with that taken in the preceding 
states.  The Kansas Bank Commissioner has issued general guid-
ance to the effect that most types of cryptocurrency transactions 
are outside the scope of the state money transmitter laws, alt-
hough the relevant opinion does carve out transmission activities 
involving centralized virtual currencies,139 saying that those kinds 
of operations are so complicated and varied that a general state-
ment applicable in all cases is not possible.140  With this caveat in 
mind, the conclusion of this guidance is that decentralized “cryp-
tocurrencies as currently in existence are not considered ‘money’ 
136. See Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Reg., Regulatory Guidance on Digital Currency
Under the Ill. Transmitters of Money Act at 2, 5 (June 13, 2017), [https://perma.cc/QAA5-
JC26)].  
137. Frequently Asked Questions - Non-Depository, N.D. DEP’T OF FIN. INST.,
[https://perma.cc/BT7M-HFJB] (providing the answer in response to: “Do I need a money 
transmitter license to purchase, sell, or operate an exchange for virtual currency?”). 
138. Memorandum from Greg Gonzales, Comm’r of Tenn. Dep’t of Fin. Inst.’s on
Regulatory Treatment of Virtual Currencies Under the Tenn. Money Transmitter Act to All 
Virtual Currency Co.’s Operating or Desiring to Operate in Tenn. 1 (Dec. 16, 2015) (2015 
WL 10385047). 
139. Office of the State Bank Comm’r of Kan., Guidance Document MT 2014-01 on
Regulatory Treatment of Virtual Currencies Under the Kansas Money Transmitter Act at 1-
2 (June 6, 2014), [https://perma.cc/5BVE-MP9U]. 
140. Id. at 1.
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or ‘monetary value’” and therefore are not subject to the money 
transmitter act.141  
Massachusetts’ regulations on money servicers do not men-
tion virtual currencies, and the state’s Division of Banks has no 
official guidance on whether money servicers require a license 
under the state’s Money Transmitter act.142  However, in replies 
to inquiries by virtual currency businesses, the Division has noted 
that under Massachusetts law, only “foreign transmittal 
agenc[ies]” require a license from the State, and under that provi-
sion, domestic crypto-based businesses are not money transmit-
ters.143  
Pennsylvania’s approach is similar to that taken by Kansas.  
In 2014, the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities 
provided informal guidance that “virtual currencies like Bitcoin 
are not ‘money’” and therefore transmission of them would not 
require a license.144  In January 2019, the same department pub-
lished additional guidance clarifying that, generally, virtual cur-
rency trading platforms are not money transmitters under state 
law.145  Thus, like Kansas, Pennsylvania does not generally in-
clude crypto-based businesses within the scope of its money 
transmitter statute but has noted that some cryptocurrencies (those 
that are not “like Bitcoin”) may be so regulated.  
Texas also agrees that crypto is generally outside the scope 
of its money transmitter laws but notes that some crypto business 
will be regulated.  Unlike Kansas and Pennsylvania, the Texas 
authorities have provided more specific advice about the kinds of 
141. Id. at 3.
142. See, e.g., Receipts of Deposits for Transmittal to Foreign Countries, MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 169 §§ 1-16 (1991). 
143. Mass. Division of Banks, Opinion Letter 18-003, Do Business Activities, as De-
scribed, for Purchase, Sale and Exchange of Virtual Currency Require a License from the 
Division of Banks, (June 14, 2018), [https://perma.cc/YK9E-L8G7].  See also Mass. Divi-
sion of Banks, Opinion Letter 18-002, Do Business Activities Involving the Sale of Crypto-
currency, as Described, Require Licensure from the Division of Banks, (Mar. 9, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/T9G4-PSPY].
144. See Pa. Dep’t of Banking and Sec., Bitcoin Update, 6 QUARTER 11 (2014),
https://www.dobs.pa.gov/Documents/Newsletter/Newsletter%20Volume%206/Quar-
ter21vol6FINAL.pdf (emphasis added). 
145. This guidance concludes bluntly that “these [virtual currency] Platforms are not
money transmitters.”  PA. DEP’T OF BANKING AND SEC., MONEY TRANSMITTER ACT 
GUIDANCE FOR VIRTUAL CURRENCY BUSINESSES (2019), [https://perma.cc/VZJ5-6CSG].  
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crypto that are potentially within the statute.  The Texas Depart-
ment of Banking first issued a supervisory memorandum regard-
ing the legal status of virtual currency under the Texas Money 
Services Act in 2014.146  Under the position taken in that docu-
ment, virtual currencies were simply not considered money and 
crypto-based businesses fell outside the reach of state money 
transmitter laws.147  However, that document was updated and re-
vised in 2019.148  Under the approach set forth in this memoran-
dum, Texas continued to opine that, speaking generally, under the 
Texas Finance Code, “neither centralized virtual currencies nor 
cryptocurrencies are coin and paper money issued by the govern-
ment of a country, [and therefore] they cannot be considered cur-
rencies . . . .”149  In addition, the department reached the same 
conclusion under the state money services act.150  However, as re-
vised, the state has now concluded that the state finance and 
money transmission laws do apply to stablecoins backed by a sov-
ereign currency where holders have a redemption right.151  In ad-
dition, in Texas, the exchange of crypto for sovereign currency 
can involve money transmission.152 
California has also concluded that virtual currency is gener-
ally outside its current money transmission requirements, but the 
path to this conclusion was far from straightforward.  In fact, Cal-
ifornia originally appeared to interpret its state money transmitter 
act very broadly.  On May 30, 2013, the state Department of Fi-
nancial Institutions issued a cease and desist letter to the nonprofit 
Bitcoin Foundation warning that it could be subject to fines of up 
to $1000 per day or per violation by acting as an unlicensed 
146. TEX. DEP’T OF BANKING, SUPERVISORY MEMORANDUM 1037, REGULATORY
TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY UNDER THE TEXAS MONEY SERVICES ACT (Apr. 3, 
2014), [http://perma.cc/5WKA-N6K7]. 
147. Id. at 3.
148. TEX. DEP’T OF BANKING, SUPERVISORY MEMORANDUM 1037, REGULATORY
TREATMENT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY UNDER THE TEXAS MONEY SERVICES ACT (rev. Apr. 
1, 2019), [https://perma.cc/XSC4-RNGT]. 
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 4.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 4-5.
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money transmitter.153  Criminal penalties were also threatened.154  
However, eighteen months later, the California Department of 
Business Oversight took a more thorough look at the question of 
how digital currencies should be treated under existing state 
law.155  That Department eventually concluded that the state’s cur-
rent money transmitter laws would not be applied to crypto and 
instead suggested that the state legislature should consider the is-
sue.156  As of March 2020, California is considering the ULC’s 
Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act, but the 
state currently has no money transmitter requirements applicable 
to crypto businesses.157  Previous efforts at imposing state regula-
tory requirements on crypto businesses as money transmitters, in-
cluding an effort to adopt something akin to New York’s contro-
versial BitLicense,158 failed, and there is substantial opposition to 
the current bill.159  As of the date of this writing, therefore, Cali-
fornia’s most recent pronouncement is an opinion placing crypto 
outside the existing money transmitter framework. 
E. Interpretive Guidance Including Crypto Businesses
Naturally, given the widely divergent approaches taken to-
ward crypto by the states, not every interpretive decision or guid-
ance agrees that crypto generally falls outside conventional 
money transmissions provisions.  Although most states have 
found that traditional money transmitter statutes are not broad 
enough to reach crypto, thereby necessitating a legislative 
153. Danny Bradbury, California Issues Cease and Desist Letter to Bitcoin Founda-
tion, COINDESK (June 23, 2013), [https://perma.cc/JG98-WCRU]. 
154. Id.
155. Katie Orr, California Considering Virtual Currency Regulations, KPBS (Dec. 8,
2014), [https://perma.cc/5QQJ-Y9BR]. 
156. James Nash, California Agency Ends Plan to Regulate Digital Currency,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 22, 2015), [https://perma.cc/Q2QN-VABS]. 
157. Paddy Baker, ‘Innovation Crushing’ Crypto Law Could Sneak Through Califor-
nia Legislature, CRYPTO BRIEFING (Sept. 30, 2019), [https://perma.cc/C8SM-HQQD]; up-
dated per list of states with pending acts, ULC, Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses 
Act, [https://perma.cc/AGZ2-KXP3] (archived on March 24, 2020). 
158. See, e.g., Charlie Richards, California Considers US$5,000 BitLicense-Style
Scheme for “Virtual Currency,” COIN TEL. (Mar. 16, 2015), [https://perma.cc/JM7K-
3EEY].  
159. Baker, supra note 157.
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response, some states disagree and have interpreted existing pro-
visions to include cryptoassets.  
Colorado is illustrative of this approach.  This state has con-
cluded that crypto is covered by Colorado’s conventional money 
transmitter statute notwithstanding the lack of express language 
applicable to virtual currency or cryptoassets in the act itself.160  
In Interim Guidance issued in 2018, the state concluded “[i]f a 
person is engaged in the business of transmitting money from one 
consumer to another within an exchange through the medium of 
cryptocurrency, that act would constitute money transmission and 
would be subject to licensure under the Colorado law.”161  
Louisiana has also interpreted its state money transmitter act 
expansively.  The Louisiana statute defines “money” or “mone-
tary value” to mean “currency or a claim that can be converted 
into currency through a financial institution, electronic payments 
network, or other formal or informal payment system.”162  “Cur-
rency” is limited to “the coin and paper money of the United 
States or another country that is designated as legal tender . . . .”163  
Despite this limiting language, the state’s Office of Financial In-
stitutions has issued public guidance concluding that persons who 
would be classified as “exchangers” by FinCEN will be subject 
to licensure as money transmitters in Louisiana.164 As mentioned 
earlier,165 FinCEN has concluded that “a person is an exchanger 
and a money transmitter if the person accepts convertible virtual 
currency from one person and transmits it to another person as 
part of the acceptance and transfer of currency, funds, or other 
value that substitutes for currency.”166  This means that a person 
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-110-103 (2017) (defining a number of terms, but not ref-
erencing virtual currency or monetary value). 
161. DIVISION OF BANKING, COLO. DEPT. OF REG. AGENCIES, INTERIM REGULATORY
GUIDANCE, CRYPTOCURRENCY AND THE COLORADO MONEY TRANSMITTERS ACT (Sept. 
20, 2018), [https://perma.cc/DL43-BQDD]. 
162. LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:1032(12) (2008).
163. LA. STAT. ANN. § 6:1032(6).
164. See LA. OFFICE OF FIN. INST., CONSUMER AND INVESTOR ADVISORY ON 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY (Aug. 2014), [https://perma.cc/DKN9-MRH7]. 
165. See supra Part IV.
166. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-R011,
REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS 
TO A VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM (Oct. 27, 2014), [https://perma.cc/H6KP-
WLE4] (citing 2013 GUIDANCE, supra note 13). 
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is subject to the Louisiana money transmitter act if it is in the 
business of accepting and converting a real currency into virtual 
currency, or vice versa, or converting one form of crypto into an-
other, on behalf of third parties. 
New Mexico takes a similar position.  As is the case with 
other conventional money transmitter laws that have not been re-
cently updated, the state’s statute does not explicitly mention “vir-
tual currencies.”167  Nonetheless, the New Mexico Regulation and 
Licensing Department has determined that “any entity engaged in 
the business of providing the exchange of virtual currency for 
money or any other form of monetary value or stored value to 
persons located in the State of New Mexico must be licensed . . . 
as a money transmitter.”168 
Oregon’s Money Transmitter Act also lacks any explicit ref-
erence to “virtual currency” or “monetary value.”169  Regardless 
of that fact, the state has concluded that the statute includes virtual 
currencies:  
Persons selling or issuing payment instruments or receiving 
money for transmission or transmitting money are required 
to be licensed as money transmitters.  The purpose of licens-
ing is to ensure that consumers receive money services in a 
secure manner.  The definition of “money” is defined in stat-
ute to cover the ever changing landscape of virtual currency, 
including Bitcoin.170  
Florida also has a broad interpretation of its money transmitter 
requirements, although the guidance in Florida comes not from 
an administrative agency but from the courts.  The Florida money 
services businesses statute171 does not specifically reference 
crypto or virtual currency, applying by its terms only to a business 
that receives “currency, monetary value, or payment instruments 
167. New Mexico is one of the jurisdictions that has adopted the UMSA, and it is cod-
ified in that state’s laws at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-32-102 (2019). 
168. Money Service Business: FAQ’s, N.M. REG. & LICENSING DEPT.,
[https://perma.cc/M472-85AP]. 
169. OR. REV. STAT. § 717.200 (2015) (defining money, money transmission, and pay-
ment instrument, and several other terms, but not mentioning “virtual currency” or “mone-
tary value”). 
170. Money Transmitters Definition, OR. BUS. XPRESS LICENSE DIRECTORY,
[https://perma.cc/2ELC-NLRS]. 
171. This legislation is codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 560.103-.144 (2012).
336 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:2 
for the purpose of transmitting the same.”172  The statute does in-
clude any “medium of exchange, whether or not redeemable in 
currency” in the definition of “monetary value.”173  
The issue of whether this language covered crypto-based 
business was at the heart of Florida v. Espinoza,174 a case brought 
by the state against Michell Espinoza for money laundering in-
volving bitcoin.  The trial court dismissed that criminal infor-
mation, under the rationale that bitcoin was not “money” as de-
fined by the state money laundering statute.175  In response to this 
decision, Florida House Bill 1379 was adopted and went into ef-
fect July 1, 2017.  That legislation added the term “virtual cur-
rency” to the definition of “monetary instruments” under Flor-
ida’s Money Laundering Act.176  As amended, the state’s money 
laundering statute now defines virtual currency as “a medium of 
exchange in electronic or digital format that is not a coin or cur-
rency of the United States or any other country.”177  The legisla-
ture did not amend the state money transmission statue, suggest-
ing under the rationale of Espinoza that crypto would not be 
“money” under its provisions. 
Complicating matters, in February 2019, the Third District 
Court of Appeal’s reversed the trial court’s decision in Espinoza, 
deciding “that selling bitcoin requires a Florida money service 
business license.”178  The appellate court held that bitcoin is a 
“payment instrument,” apparently bringing crypto within the 
scope of Florida’s money transmission laws.179  Whether other 
courts or administrative agencies in Florida will concur is unclear, 
but the latest guidance from the state (in the form of an appellate 
court’s opinion) suggests that crypto is covered by the money 
transmission statute. 
172. FLA. STAT. § 560.103(23).
173. FLA. STAT. § 560.103(21).
174. See Florida v. Espinoza, No. F14-293, 2016 WL 11613849 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 22,
2016), rev’d 264 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). 
175. Id.
176. FLA. STAT. § 896.101 (2017).
177. FLA. STAT. § 896.101.
178. See Justin S. Wales, Bitcoin Has a Florida Problem, COINDESK (Feb. 24, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/2ATP-BYUM]. 
179. Id.
2020 THE CASE FOR PREEMPTING 337 
VI.  SCOPE OF EXISTING REQUIREMENTS
The preceding discussion focuses on why governments reg-
ulate money transmitters and the range of businesses potentially 
impacted by money transmitter requirements.  By itself, this 
might not be worrisome, but the incredible range of requirements, 
particularly at the state level, makes these results problematic for 
crypto-based businesses.  Crypto businesses dealing in digital as-
sets are particularly likely to do business in multiple jurisdictions 
and therefore will be faced with a number of differing require-
ments because states do not have consistent rules regarding how 
money transmitters should be regulated.  
A. Federal Regulation
The federal requirements for money transmitters are rela-
tively easy to describe. Once a business is found to be a money 
transmitter under the BSA,180 it will be regulated as a money ser-
vices business (MSB) and must adopt policies to ensure that it 
does not facilitate criminal conduct.  In essence, MSBs are re-
quired to register with FinCEN and renew that registration every 
two years; they must maintain an agents list; they must establish 
a written AML program; they must report certain transactions; 
and they are required to retain records of various transactions.181  
While this may seem like a lot, the federal registration pro-
cess is performed by completing an electronic questionnaire.182  
The required responses focus on basic information about the reg-
istrant, and ongoing compliance is not intended to impose signif-
icant costs on the businesses.  Obviously, MSBs must adopt a 
risk-based AML program, which may entail substantial adjust-
ments to the company’s business operations, and the company 
must satisfy recordkeeping and reporting obligations.  On the 
other hand, FinCEN has explicitly announced that although 
180. FinCEN has issued regulations implementing recordkeeping, reporting, and other
requirements consistent with the BSA with respect to money services businesses, including 
money transmitters.  2011 Regulations, supra note 13. 
181. For a list of regulatory requirements for MSBs, see BSA Requirements for MSBs,
FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, [https://perma.cc/EKC9-B7FP] (the live page for this con-
tains links for each required action with additional details).   
182. Money Services Business (MSB) Registration, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK,
[https://perma.cc/6V65-BT5C]. 
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covered businesses must establish an independent audit function 
to test their anti-money laundering programs, they “are not re-
quired to hire a certified public accountant or an outside consult-
ant to conduct a review of their programs.”183  
Because safety of the customer’s funds and soundness of the 
business are not primary motivations behind the federal law, at 
the current time there are no minimum capital requirements, no 
minimum net worth standards, no security or bonding obligations, 
and no licensing fees assessed at the federal level.184  A strong 
case can be made that the existing federal requirements are a rea-
sonable and appropriately targeted reaction to the need to mini-
mize AML risks and problems associated with the potential fund-
ing of illegal enterprises.185 
B. The Range of State Responses
As mentioned above, most states are more concerned with 
consumer protection, and as such they have devised money trans-
mitter requirements that focus on safety and soundness.  This is a 
natural response to concerns that money transmitter businesses 
might abscond with the funds or otherwise fail to deliver them in 
accordance with customer instructions.186  There are therefore a 
number of similar requirements for money transmitters in most 
states—although with regard to each issue, the details vary sig-
nificantly. 
First, state money transmitter statutes typically condition the 
granting of a license upon a showing that the applicant, and often 
a number of its agents or control persons, possess a certain kind 
of character.  For example, under the UMSA, an applicant must 
show that its “financial condition and responsibility, financial and 
183. Frequently Asked Questions Conducting Independent Reviews of Money Services
Business Anti-Money Laundering Programs, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK (Sept. 22, 
2006), [https://perma.cc/QFW7-6SVA]. 
184. FinCEN maintains a list of BSA Requirements.  See BSA Requirements, supra
note 181.  The listed items relate to registration and renewal, establishing and maintaining 
an AML program, record-keeping, and reporting obligations.  Id. 
185. See, e.g., Lo, supra note 6, at 113-17 (criticizing the state system after concluding
that the “federal money transmitter regulation appears reasonably well calibrated to the risk 
posed by payments startups”). 
186. See supra Section III.B. for a consideration of state objectives in regulating money
transmitters. 
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business experience, competence, character, and general fitness,” 
as well as those of its “executive officers, managers, directors, 
and persons in control of [it]” are such that “it is in the interest of 
the public to permit the applicant to engage in money transmis-
sion . . . .”187  This language appears in the money transmitter or 
money services statutes in a number of states, providing wide lat-
itude to inquire into and investigate the applicant’s background.188 
Other states, while using different language, have adopted 
the same general requirement.  For example, Alabama requires 
applicants to be investigated for “responsibility, financial and 
business experience, character, and general fitness.”189  In order 
to qualify for licensure as a money services business in Florida, 
an applicant must “[d]emonstrate to the office the character and 
general fitness necessary to command the confidence of the pub-
lic and warrant the belief that the money services business or de-
ferred presentment provider shall be operated lawfully and 
fairly.”190  The Hawaii statute says that “[u]pon the filing of a 
complete application, the commissioner shall investigate the fi-
nancial condition and responsibility, financial and business expe-
rience, character, and general fitness of the applicant.  The com-
missioner may conduct an on-site investigation of the applicant, 
the reasonable cost of which shall be borne by the applicant.”191  
Tennessee’s Money Transmitter Act states that an “applicant 
must demonstrate experience, character, and general fitness to 
command the confidence of the public and warrant the belief that 
the business to be operated will be operated lawfully and 
fairly.”192  Texas says that  
187. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 205(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004).  The UMSA
application requires that the application include a list of criminal convictions of all such 
persons and any material litigation for the prior ten years, as well as information about any 
bankruptcy proceedings of such persons.  UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 202(b)(2), (b)(6), 
(c)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2004). 
188. For example, Arkansas has codified the UMSA requirements at ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-55-205(a)(2) (2011).
189. ALA. CODE § 8-7a-8(a) (2017).
190. FLA. STAT. § 560.1401(1) (2014).
191. HAW. REV. STAT. § 489D-11(a) (2009).
192. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-205(d) (2007).
340 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:2 
[T]o qualify for a license under this chapter, an applicant
must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the commissioner
that:
(1) the financial responsibility and condition, financial
and business experience, competence, character, and
general fitness of the applicant justify the confidence
of the public and warrant the belief that the applicant
will conduct business in compliance with this chapter
and the rules adopted under this chapter and other ap-
plicable state and federal law;
(2) the issuance of the license is in the public interest
. . . .193
In Utah, an applicant is required to “demonstrate experience, 
character, and general fitness to command the confidence of the 
public and warrant the belief that the business to be operated will 
be operated lawfully and fairly.”194  Virginia requires that the 
character of the applicant and its control people is such that there 
is reason to believe the business will be operated fairly.195 
Oddly, the Iowa statutes requires the state superintendent of 
banking to “investigate the applicant’s financial condition and re-
sponsibility, financial and business experience, character, and 
general fitness,” but for money transmitters the statute does not 
specifically give the banking supervisor authority to withhold the 
license on grounds of poor character.196  
In addition to the character requirements, most states rely on 
what has sometimes been referred to as the “three-legged stool” 
approach to insuring safety and soundness of money services 
193. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.202(a)(1)-(2) (West 2005).
194. 2015 UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-25-203(1)(b) (West 2015).
195. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1906(A) (2014).
196. IOWA CODE § 533C.204(1) (2003).  But see IOWA CODE § 533C.303(1)(d) (2004)
(setting out grounds to deny application to act as a currency exchange, which does include 
that basis for denying a license). 
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businesses:197 surety or bonding requirements; minimum net 
worth; and limits on permissible investments.198 
The requirement that a money transmitter maintain a surety 
bond or an equivalent form of security appears in most state 
money transmitter or money service businesses statutes.  The 
amount required, however, differs.  When the ULC adopted the 
UMSA, they recognized the range of requirements, and therefore 
drafted a model provision that lists amounts in brackets, signify-
ing acknowledgement of the reality that the states have not agreed 
on what a suitable level of security entails.  As currently written, 
UMSA requires “a surety bond, letter of credit, or other similar 
security acceptable to the [superintendent] in the amount of 
[$50,000] plus [$10,000] per location, not exceeding a total addi-
tion of [$250,000], must accompany an application for a li-
cense.”199  In accordance with the most widely taken approach, 
the bond or other security must last during the period when the 
applicant is licensed and must continue for at least five years after 
services in the state are discontinued.200  In addition, the model 
language includes a provision authorizing state authorities to in-
crease the bond requirement up to $1,000,000 “if the financial 
condition of a licensee so requires.”201  
The CSBS, in proposing amendments to UMSA, has sug-
gested that bond requirements should be tied to activity levels of 
the business.  Their proposal would start with a minimum bond 
of $100,000, with bond requirements increasing to $1,000,000 
197. This term is used by various sources in describing safety and soundness require-
ments.  In the context of money services, see MSB Model Law Executive Summary, CONF. 
ST. BANK SUPERVISORS (Sept. 2019), [https://perma.cc/SP8X-T5SY] [hereinafter CSBS, 
Summary].  For other uses of the term, see E. Norman Veasey et al., Delaware Supports 
Directors with a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 
42 BUS. LAW. 399, 401 (1987); Becky McCray, Stop Using “3 Legged Stool” to Describe 
Any Idea, SMALL BIZ SURVIVAL (June 24, 2019), [https://perma.cc/CP5E-47R3] (“There are 
dozens and dozens of 3 legged stool analogies.  The Three Legged Stool of Retirement Plan-
ning . . . of Politics . . . of Sustainability . . . of Accounting . . . of Organizational Architec-
ture.”).  
198. See CSBS, Summary, supra note 197.
199. UMSA, supra note 54, § 204(a).  “Superintendent” is in brackets to acknowledge
that different states give oversight responsibility to different officials or agencies. 
200. Id.; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-7A-7(d) (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-204(d)
(2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.11-013(6) (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-2727(7) 
(2017). 
201. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 204(f) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N  2004).
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when transaction activity increases to $45 million.202  In addition, 
state authorities would have discretion to increase the required 
bond amounts up to $7 million.203 Current bonding amounts in 
place at the state level reveal a distinct lack of agreement over 
how much security should be required, with a minority of states 
approaching the levels suggested by the CSBS.  
At the low end are states that require amounts as low as 
$10,000, although in each of these jurisdictions the appropriate 
authority is authorized to increase that required amount up to a 
predetermined maximum.  For example, Arkansas requires a 
surety bond between $10,000 and $300,000 based on the previous 
year’s transaction volume.204  The state Securities Commissioner 
has the authority to increase the amount required to $1,000,000.205  
In Hawaii, the statute specifies that “[e]ach application for a li-
cense shall be accompanied by a surety bond, irrevocable letter of 
credit, or other similar security device acceptable to the commis-
sioner in the amount of $10,000,” which can be increased to “a 
maximum of $500,000 upon the basis of the impaired financial 
condition of a licensee, as evidenced by a reduction in net worth, 
financial losses, or other relevant criteria.”206  In Washington, 
“[t]he minimum surety bond must be at least ten thousand dollars, 
and [is] not to exceed five hundred fifty thousand dollars.”207  The 
state Director of the Department of Financial Institutions is to 
adopt rules implementing this requirement, basing the amount of 
the bond on the prior year’s activity levels.208 
In the mid-range are a number of states that require a mini-
mum bond of $50,000, again with increases in the amount either 
permitted or required under certain circumstances.  In Florida, the 
minimum surety bond is to be specified by rule, but must be be-
tween $50,000 and $2 million.209  According to the statute, “[t]he 
rule shall provide allowances for the financial condition, number 
202. See CSBS, Summary, supra note 197.
203. Id.  As of the date this Article was written, the CSBS was still in the process of
evaluating and revising its proposal. Id. 
204. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-204(a).
205. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-204(e).
206. HAW. REV. STAT. § 489D-7(a) (2018).
207. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.050(1) (2017).
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.050(1).
209. FLA. STAT. § 560.209(3)(a) (2009).
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of locations, and anticipated volume of the licensee.”210  Simi-
larly, in Iowa, the state requires money transmitters to include “a 
surety bond, letter of credit, or other similar security acceptable 
to the superintendent in the amount of fifty thousand dollars plus 
ten thousand dollars per location, not exceeding a total addition 
of three hundred thousand dollars” with their application.211  If the 
applicant has no locations in Iowa, the Superintendent of Banking 
is to set a bond amount not exceeding $300,000.212  In addition, 
the Superintendent can also increase the bond amount up to 
$1,000,000.213  Tennessee also requires applications to be accom-
panied by a $50,000 surety bond or equivalent device, with an 
additional $10,000 per location, up to a maximum of $800,000.214 
Some states require a higher minimum bond.  Alabama, for 
example, requires money transmitters to post a bond in an amount 
determined by the Alabama Securities Commission, but the min-
imum bond is set by statute at the higher of $100,000 or 100% of 
the average daily outstanding obligations for money received for 
transmission in Alabama plus 50% of the daily stored value of 
outstanding payment instrument and store value obligations in the 
state, to a maximum of $5,000,000.215  Texas sets the minimum 
bond at the greater of $300,000 or 1% of the “total yearly dollar 
volume of money transmission business in [the] state” (or pro-
jected volume of business in Texas for the first year of opera-
tions), up to a maximum of $2,000,000.216 
The second leg of the so-called safety and soundness stool is 
minimum net worth, and again, there is a considerable range 
among the states as to what net worth is required to operate as a 
money transmitter. 
The UMSA suggests a relatively low minimum net worth, 
although the recommended amount (“[$25,000] determined in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles”)217 is set 
out in brackets to denote the reality that states disagree on how 
210. FLA. STAT. § 560.209(3)(a).
211. IOWA CODE § 533C.203(1) (2003).
212. IOWA CODE § 533C.203(1).
213. IOWA CODE § 533C.203(6).
214. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-2080(a) (1995).
215. ALA. CODE § 8-7a-7 (2017).
216. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.308 (West 2017).
217. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 207 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2004).
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high to set the bar.  The UMSA also includes a comment, explain-
ing the low value in the model act provision: 
Only a minimal net worth requirement has been suggested 
because net worth is used as an additional requirement to 
make sure that license applicants and licensees have some 
resources for commencing and operating a money transmis-
sion business.  Section 207 has been bracketed because some 
States use net worth as part of the safety and soundness 
mechanisms whereas other States rely on bonding/security 
and permissible investment requirements instead.  This Act 
gives States the option of choosing between a combination 
of security, net worth and permissible investment require-
ments as prudential measures . . . .218 
Some states currently impose low minimum worth requirements.  
The lowest minimum net worth for money transmitters appears in 
Hawaii, which requires licensees to have “a net worth of not less 
than $1,000, calculated in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles.”219  In Washington State the minimum tangi-
ble net worth for money transmitters is to be set by the Director 
of the Department of Financial Institutions at an amount which is 
“at least ten thousand dollars and not more than three million dol-
lars.”220  Alabama requires $25,000 in net worth, as suggested in 
the UMSA.221  
Other states impose net worth requirements that appear to be 
mid-range.  In this category are states like Arkansas, which says 
that licensed money transmitters must maintain a minimum net 
worth of the greater of $50,000 or $10,000 for every $1,000,000 
of the previous year’s total money transmissions, payment instru-
ment volume, and stored dollar volume.222  This section of the Ar-
kansas Code does not establish a cap on the required minimum 
net worth. 
At the higher end of net worth requirements are states requir-
ing a minimum of $100,000 or $200,000 in net worth in order to 
obtain a license.  For example, a Florida licensee must have a net 
worth of at least $100,000, plus $10,000 for every additional 
218. UNIF. MONEY SERVS. ACT § 207 cmt. 2.
219. HAW. REV. STAT. § 489D-6(a) (2006).
220. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.060 (2010).
221. ALA. CODE § 8-7A-10 (2017).
222. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-207 (2019).
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location in the state, up to a maximum of $2,000,000.223  The re-
quired net worth must be maintained at all times.  Tennessee re-
quires money transmitters to maintain a minimum net worth be-
tween $100,000 and $500,000, depending on the number of 
locations and agents in the state.224  Texas requires money trans-
mission licensees to maintain a minimum net worth of $100,000 
if the licensee has four or fewer locations, and a minimum net 
worth of $500,000 “if business is proposed to be or is conducted, 
directly or through an authorized delegate, at five or more loca-
tions or over the Internet.”225  (The Texas banking commissioner 
may also increase the required net worth to a maximum of $1 mil-
lion.)226  Virginia requires licensees to maintain a minimum net 
worth of $200,000.227 
Iowa appears to be on the high end as well, although its net 
worth requirements for money transmitters are variable.  The 
Iowa statute says:  
A licensee shall maintain at all times permissible invest-
ments that have a market value computed in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles of not less than the 
aggregate amount of all of its outstanding payment instru-
ments and stored-value obligations issued or sold and money 
transmitted by the licensee in the United States.228  
This appears to be on the high end because the required net worth 
is calculated based on the outstanding payment obligations sold 
and transmitted throughout the United States. 
Finally, Utah is an outlier, requiring what appears to be a 
very high minimum net worth for all money transmitters.  Utah 
requires that an applicant must “demonstrate, and a licensee shall 
maintain, a net worth of not less than $1,000,000 as demonstrated 
by a financial statement for the most recent fiscal year that is 
223. FLA. STAT. § 560.209(1) (2009).
224. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-205(a) (2009) (requiring a $100,000 minimum net
worth for the company plus an additional $25,000 per additional location or agent located in 
Tennessee, up to $500,000). 
225. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.307(a) (West 2017).
226. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.307(b).
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1906(B) (2014).
228. IOWA CODE § 533C.601(1) (2003).
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prepared and certified by an independent auditor and is satisfac-
tory to the commissioner . . . .”229 
The last of the typical safety and soundness requirements re-
lates to limitations on permissible investments by money trans-
mitters.  As noted by the CSBS, limitations on the kinds of invest-
ments that are permissible for MSBs “have traditionally served as 
the primary safety element for consumer funds.”230  In general, 
money transmitters are required to invest only in highly secure, 
liquid assets, such as cash, certificates of deposit, and highly rated 
investment grade securities. 
Some states have statutes that specify the acceptable assets 
for these businesses.  For example, Arkansas limits permissible 
investments for money services businesses to highly secure as-
sets, such as cash, certificates of deposits, investments rated at 
one of the three highest grades as defined by a nationally recog-
nized securities ratings institution, government backed obliga-
tions, and some receivables and interest-bearing obligations to the 
extent that they do not exceed 20% of the company’s total invest-
ments.231  Florida includes the same general requirements,232 as 
does Tennessee.233  In Texas, licensees may invest in cash, certif-
icates of deposit, senior debt, investment grade securities, certain 
receivables valued at 40% of their face amount from delegates 
resulting from licensed money transmission, and such other assets 
as the banking commission may permit by rule.234 
Other states authorize officials in the state to specify what 
sorts of investments are acceptable.  For example, in Iowa, the 
superintendent of banks has authority to limit the extent to which 
particular investments are acceptable, except for money and cer-
tificates of deposit issued by a bank, which are always permissi-
ble.235 
Outside of these three major components of state safety and 
soundness regulations, state money transmitter laws also contain 
229. 2015 UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-25-203(1)(a) (West 2015).
230. CSBS, Summary, supra note 197 (citing UMSA, supra note 60, at § 701).
231. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-702 (2008).
232. FLA. STAT. § 560.210(1) (2009).
233. In the Tennessee statutes, “permissible investments” are listed in the definitions
provision.  See TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-203 (2007). 
234. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 151.309 (West 2005).
235. IOWA CODE § 533C.601(2) (2003).
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varied filing and renewal fees,236 and an assortment of additional 
requirements. 
In addition to application and licensing fees, bonding and 
minimum net worth requirements, and limitations on permissible 
investments, state money transmitter statutes also impose a range 
of additional conditions on licensees.  For example, there are pe-
riodic and ongoing examinations or investigations, which take 
place at different intervals and on different schedules depending 
on each state.237  A range of reports are also required, again with 
substantial variation among what is required and how frequently 
the information must be reported. 
In Arkansas, money transmitters must file annual renewal 
reports accompanied by specified licensing fees.238  In addition, 
quarterly reports must be made with the number and dollar value 
236. Money transmitters are typically charged an application and/or licensing fee as
well as periodic fees or assessments by each state in which they do business.  These fees are 
not particularly large, but they add up for multi-state operations. 
In Arkansas, “[a] nonrefundable application fee of $1,500 and a license fee of $375 
must accompany an application for a license under this article.”  ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-
402(b) (2019).  Only the $375 license fee is refundable in Arkansas if the application is 
rejected.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-402(b).  Similar rules apply in Iowa, where “[a] nonre-
fundable application fee of one thousand dollars and a license fee must accompany an appli-
cation for a license under this article.”  IOWA CODE § 533C.202(4) (2013).  The Iowa license 
fee, which like Arkansas’s is refundable, is set at $500 plus $10 for each location in Iowa at 
which business is conducted, to be capped at $5000.  IOWA CODE § 533C.202(4).  See also 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-209 (1995) (requiring an application fee of between $250 and 
$500); V VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1905(A) (2019) (stipulating a $750 annual fee); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 6.2-1905(B) (stipulating annual assessment to defray costs of examination).  The 
UMSA suggests an application fee of $2000 and a license fee of the same amount.  UMSA, 
supra note 60, §202(d).  The UMSA application fee is nonrefundable, and in addition, a 
$2000 annual renewal fee is required.  UMSA, supra note 60, § 206(a).  These amounts ap-
pear to be relatively typical. 
237. See generally Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Conference of State Bank
Supervisors & Money Transmitter Regulators Association, CSBS 9-10 (May 2016), 
[https://perma.cc/7242-SXZM] [hereinafter State Bank Regulators Report]; see also Confer-
ence of State Bank Supervisors, The State of State Money Services Businesses Regulation 
and Supervision, CSBS (Nov. 16, 2017), [https://perma.cc/W5NV-YBWX] (briefly summa-
rizing the State Bank Regulators Report).  For a sampling of state statutes explaining this 
obligation, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-601(a)-(c) (2011) (providing for annual reports and 
unannounced examinations if the state securities commissioner has reason to believe the li-
censee is engaged in an unsafe or unsound practice, plus fees for all such examinations); 
FLA. STAT. § 560.109 (2019) (providing for unannounced examinations and investigations 
to protect the public as often as warranted, but in no case no less frequently than every five 
years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-214 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1910(A) (2014); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 19.230.110(1) (2017). 
238. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-206 (2019).
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of payment instruments, stored value, and prepaid access sold in 
the state as well as amounts outstanding, and special reports are 
required from licensees in any quarter in which there is a change 
in agents or locations in the state.239  Licensees must also file with 
the state upon any felony charge or conviction of control persons 
and certain affiliates, the cancelation of bonds maintained by the 
licensee, any petition to revoke or suspend license anywhere, and 
give notice within three days following any bankruptcy filing or 
petition for receivership, dissolution, or reorganization.240 
In Colorado, the state bank commissioner has authority to 
examine books and records, and charge fees set by banking board, 
and licensees are required to file audited financial statements an-
nually.241  Licensees are also required to file reports not less often 
than three times a year on days that the commissioner shall select 
setting out the resources and liabilities of the licensee on such day, 
as well as being obligated to make reports on the happening of 
other specified events.242 
Florida requires specific quarterly reports and a more de-
tailed annual report containing financial audit information.243  
Tennessee requires annual renewal of licenses and a renewal ap-
plication with a report of the licensee’s financial condition, in-
cluding financial statements, list of locations and agents, and no-
tification of any “material litigation or litigation relating to money 
transmission.”244  Virginia and Washington also require annual 
reports including audited financial information.245 
239. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-603.
240. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-55-603.
241. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-110-111(1)(a), (2)(a) (2017).
242. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-110-111(2)(b)(I)-(II).
243. FLA. STAT. § 560.118 (2009).
244. TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-211(d) (2013).  Tennessee also requires licensed money
transmitters to notify the state after certain events, including bankruptcy, felony indictment 
of certain parties related to the firm, or revocation of the firm’s license by any governmental 
authority.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-212 (2007). 
245. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1905(D) (2019) (requiring annual reports, including au-
dited financials); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.230.110(2) (2017) (requiring annual report includ-
ing audited financial reports, certification that company is maintaining appropriate invest-
ments and minimum bond, and description of all material changes to information previously 
submitted).  Virginia also requires money transmitters to notify the state if certain events 
occur, including material changes to information provided in the firm’s application, a filing 
for bankruptcy, and the indictment of certain parties related to the firm.  VA. CODE ANN. § 
6.2-1917(A), (C) (2019). 
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The consequences of failing to comply or in submitting in-
formation that the state deems to indicate a that the licensee is not 
complying with statutory requirements or is operating in an un-
safe or unsound manner are severe.  In most cases, the state regu-
lator can mandate corrective action or suspend or even revoke the 
license.246  
C. The Failure of Coordination and Uniformity
The problems caused by the complex patchwork of require-
ments for multi-jurisdictional money transmitters are neither new 
nor unknown.247  In 1994, as part of the Riegle Community De-
velopment and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994,248 Congress 
adopted the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994.249  That 
act specifically recommended that states adopt uniform laws for 
money services businesses such as money transmitters.250 
In response to this call for action, the Uniform Law Com-
mission (ULC) promulgated the Uniform Money Services Act 
(UMSA) in 2000.251  However, despite general recognition that 
complex and inconsistent state regulation has placed substantial 
burdens on the industry, adoption has been slow.  Since its intro-
duction, only ten states (Alaska, Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, New 
Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, and 
Washington) and two territories (Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 
246. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-7-217 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.2-1907(A)
(2014); State Bank Regulators Report, supra note 237, at 10-11. 
247. As e-commerce began to take off, calls for reform increased.  “Existing laws and
regulations that may hinder electronic commerce should be reviewed and revised or elimi-
nated to reflect the needs of the new electronic age.”  William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., 
A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, Principles § 4 (1997), 
[https://perma.cc/76B5-V8RV].  Accord Kerry Lynn Macintosh, The New Money, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 659, 659-60, 673 (1999).  Commentators have continued to push the 
need for a more uniform approach as new technologies, such as blockchain and crypto, have 
appeared.  See, e.g., Knight, supra note 54; Lo, supra note 6; Hughes, supra note 17; Kelsey 
L. Penrose, Banking on Bitcoin: Applying Anti-Money Laundering and Money Transmitter
Laws, 18 N.C. BANKING INST. 529 (2014).
248. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act, Pub. L. No.
103-325, 108 Stat. 2160, (1994) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (2004)).
249. This history is recited in the prefatory note to the UMSA.  UMSA, supra note 60,
at 5. 
250. Id.
251. See id. at 1.
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Islands) have enacted the Act.252  No new state has adopted the 
UMSA since 2016.253 
This is not to suggest that states are unaware of the problems 
posed by the lack of consistency in existing regulations.  There 
have been a number of initiatives designed to increase coordina-
tion among the states, particularly through the efforts of the 
Money Transmitter Regulators Associations (MTRA)254 and the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS).255  Both of these 
groups work to increase consistency, cooperation, and efficiency 
in the state regulation of money transmitters (although the CSBS 
is obviously focused on other financial institutions as well).256 
The primary success to date has been in efforts to coordinate 
the examination process by which money transmitters are evalu-
ated.  In 2012, the CSBS and MTRA together promulgated a na-
tionwide agreement establishing a joint examination for multi-
state MSBs.257  Among other things, the agreement establishes a 
taskforce known as the MMET (Multi-State MSB Examination 
Task Force) and sets out an information-sharing arrangement for 
the signatories.258  There is also an accompanying protocol for the 
252. A list of states having adopted the Act is maintained by the Uniform Law Com-
mission.  See UMSA, supra note 60. 
253. Id.
254. According to the group’s website, the MTRA is “a national non-profit organiza-
tion dedicated to the efficient and effective regulation of money transmission industry” in 
the U.S.  See Money Transmitter Regulator Ass’n, Welcome to MTRA, MTRA, 
[https://perma.cc/HNV9-9SCC]. One of the organization’s stated goals is to promote “a more 
efficient and less burdensome state regulatory system that has universal respect and credibil-
ity.”  Id. 
255. The CSBS is also a nationwide organization of financial regulators, designed to
state banking supervisors “a national forum to coordinate supervision and develop policy.”  
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, What Is the Conference of State Bank Supervisors?, 
CSBS, [https://perma.cc/GZ2U-WHPY].  
256. The CSBS does not limit its reach to depository institutions, and instead also con-
siders non-depository issues, such as those applicable to many money transmitters.  See Con-
ference of State Bank Supervisors, Non-Depository Issues, CSBS, [https://perma.cc/2QUS-
XB2D].  The CSBS also maintains a strong interest in FinTech.  See Conference of State 
Bank Supervisors, Financial Technology, CSBS, [https://perma.cc/N383-TW3N]. 
257. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, NATIONWIDE COOPERATIVE
AGREEMENT FOR MSB SUPERVISION 1-2 (Jan. 2012), [https://perma.cc/D9U6-UR6Y]. 
258. Id. at 2-3.
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multi-state examinations.259  As of October 2018, only three states 
were not parties to this Agreement and Protocol.260  
Members of MTRA have also signed a cooperative agree-
ment, which states that its purpose “is to promote a nationwide 
framework for cooperation and coordination among state money 
transmitter regulators that have concurrent jurisdiction over a reg-
ulated entity in a manner that conserves regulatory resources and 
minimizes the regulatory burden on supervised entities, con-
sistent with each state attaining its supervisory objectives.”261  
This Agreement focuses on the examination of multi-state money 
transmitters, setting up a system of lead state supervisors to coor-
dinate the examination process and includes information-sharing 
and enforcement provisions.262 
There is also a coordinated system through which companies 
and individuals are to apply for, amend, renew, and surrender fi-
nancial services licenses.263  
Notwithstanding the coordination of the examination pro-
cess, and the central application process used by several states, 
most states continue to apply their own standards during the ex-
amination process.264  The substantive provisions of state money 
transmitters continue to vary widely,265 and there is no agreement 
259. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, PROTOCOL FOR PERFORMING
MULTI-STATE EXAMINATIONS 1 (Jan. 2012), [https://perma.cc/DV4Z-DMN4]. 
260. See CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, CSBS/MTRA NATIONWIDE
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT & PROTOCOL FOR MSB SUPERVISION (OCT. 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/NXF6-4RJL].  In addition, between implementation and 2016 “state agen-
cies have conducted over 400 multi-state MSB examinations.”  State Bank Regulators Re-
port, supra note 237, at 11.  
261. MTRA Cooperative Agreement § 2.1, MTRA, [https://perma.cc/Q669-CUWR].
262. Id. at §§ 2.2, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1.
263. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors, Nationwide Multi-State Licensing Sys-
tem and Registry (NMLS), CSBS, [https://perma.cc/TEP8-2N89]. 
264. In early 2018, the CSBS announced a trial program in which seven states agreed
to accept the findings of a single reviewing state, although the details of the experiment were 
not released.  Andrew Bigart & Evan Minsberg, New Details on CSBS Streamlined Money 
Transmission License Application Program, Venable LLP (Mar. 8, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/BP29-GHFV]. Subsequent reports suggested that as many as twenty-one 
states were ready to join the experiment (Id.), but in April of 2019, the CSBS Progress Report 
merely stated that the state examination system was still in development, and the pilot pro-
gram was “underway.”  CSBS Vision 2020: A Progress Report, CSBS (April 25, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/RG34-5SEE] [hereinafter Progress Report].  The CSBS efforts are de-
scribed in more detail in Section VI.D., infra. 
265. See supra Part V.
352 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:2 
about how these requirements apply to crypto-based businesses.
266
D. Vision 2020 from the CSBS
Aware that a common application and examination form is 
only the first step towards a more consistent state-level approach, 
in 2017 the CSBS launched what it called Vision 2020.267  Vision 
2020 is a series of initiatives aimed at achieving an integrated 
state licensing and supervisory system for money service busi-
nesses such as money transmitters.268  The express objective of 
this project is to improve regulatory efficiency and supervision.269 
As part of its Vision 2020 initiative, CSBS announced in 
February 2018 that a group of seven states had agreed to stream-
line the money transmitter application approval process by ac-
cepting the findings of the other states regarding certain sections 
of an application.270 
On October 1, 2019, the CSBS published a draft of several 
proposals designed to improve upon the UMSA, suggesting 
amendments to “language that has been inconsistently imple-
mented or interpreted over time.” 271  A dozen comments from 
businesses and other organizations were received by the Novem-
ber 1, 2019, deadline.272 As of the date this was written, this pro-
posal is still being evaluated and modified. 
266. See supra Part I.
267. CSBS, Summary, supra note 197, at 1.
268. Id.
269. Progress Report, supra note 264.
270. Bigart & Minsberg, supra note 264.  Although state-specific materials will still
be required as part of the streamlined process, participating states would accept findings of 
an assigned state’s review as to matters such as cybersecurity, background checks, and com-
pliance with BSA requirements.  The precise list of items that participating states will accept 
is subject to change, and the list of states willing to participate was later reported to include 
twenty-one jurisdictions.  Id.  On the other hand, the April 2019 CSBS Progress Report 
merely noted that this pilot program is underway and the entire examination process is in 
development.  Progress Report, supra note 264. 
271. CSBS, Summary, supra note 197, at 1.  The CSBS draft materials were published
in links that can be found at Request for Comments: MSB Model Law, CSBS (Oct. 1, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/Y5Q7-BC7R].  Perhaps the most useful of the draft documents is a model 
law language chart, which sets out suggested language by topics.  Draft Model MSB Law 
Language by Topic, CSBS (July 10, 2019), [https://perma.cc/SS7Y-A6RG].  
272. CSBS, Comments: MSB Model Law (Oct. 1, 2019), [ https://perma.cc/EDP4-
XACB]. 
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Unfortunately, there are limits to what this approach can be 
expected to achieve.  First, individual states will have to accept 
the proposals without significant modification.  Given both past 
experience with UMSA and the wide variation in current ap-
proaches, this appears improbable.  Second, even if universally 
adopted, the updated language still retains a range of state-spe-
cific requirements.  Thus, while this is a laudable step towards 
harmonization, crypto businesses are likely to continue to face a 
confusing maze of requirements and standards.  
Major players may have an easier time complying, but 
smaller innovators are still likely to choose other markets in 
which to experiment.  A reasonable level of regulation is both 
necessary and appropriate; inadvertent barriers to competition 
and innovation because of a lack of consistency is neither. 
VII. THE CASE FOR PREEMPTION
If a uniform response at the state level is not forthcoming, 
preemption by federal action may be the only viable solution to 
addressing unnecessary complexity and over-regulation.  Cer-
tainly the federal government has the power to preempt state 
money transmitter laws that apply to multi-state operations. 
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the U.S. 
Constitution gives Congress the power “to regulate Commerce 
among the several States.”273  Moreover, in the event of a conflict 
between federal and state law, federal law prevails.274  By virtue 
of the changing nature of commerce, this means that the federal 
government now holds the power to regulate activities that were 
273. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (citing U.S. CONST. Art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3).  A number of the Court’s decisions have noted and upheld the federal govern-
ment’s exercise of power over a range of topics, some of which had more traditionally been
left to the states.  This balance exists notwithstanding the corresponding reduction in state
power when the federal government preempts state action.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103-106 (1983) (preemption of state law by the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act).
274. The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that federal law “shall be the su-
preme [l]aw” of the United States, notwithstanding any contrary state law.  U.S. CONST. Art. 
VI, cl. 2.  As the Court has noted, the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause gives the federal 
government “a decided advantage in th[e] delicate balance” between state and federal power. 
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). 
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once considered purely local.275  Preemption does, however, re-
quire an action by Congress, although the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that such preemption may be express or implied.276 
It is true that states have traditionally exercised authority 
over money transmitter businesses,277 and it is also true that there 
is a general presumption against preemption of matters that have 
275. Paul E. McGreal, Some Rice with Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in
Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823 (1995).  As commentators have ob-
served, because of the growth of interstate commerce, activities that once seemed local in 
nature have had an increasing impact on the national economy, and have therefore come 
within the scope of Congress’ commerce power.  Id at 823.  See, e.g., Katzenbach v. 
McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301, 304 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123-25 (1942). 
See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157 (“The Federal Government undertakes 
activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers . . . .”). 
276. Robert S. Peck, A Separation-of-Powers Defense of the “Presumption Against
Preemption,” 84 TUL. L. REV. 1185, 1189 (2010).  Express preemption exists where Con-
gress includes language to that effect in the federal law.  This is the easiest case in which to 
find preemption.  Id. at 1189-90.  Implied preemption can be based on field preemption 
(which occurs where the federal action is so comprehensive that it can be said to fully occupy 
the field) (Id. at 1189, 1191), direct conflict (where the state provision directly conflicts a 
portion of the federal law), or possibly obstacle preemption (where the state law presents an 
obstacle to accomplishing the objectives of the federal law) (Id. at 1189, 1193).  Compare 
M’Colloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 319 (1819) (“It is of the very essence of supremacy, 
to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power 
vested in subordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influ-
ence. . . .”) with Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000) (iden-
tifying only express, field, and conflict preemption).  For a more complete analysis of 
whether implied obstacle preemption continues to be a valid theory, see Lauren Gilbert, Im-
migrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2012); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000).  Nel-
son’s article appears to have influenced Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas’s thinking 
on preemption.  See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 582-83 (2009) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 621-22 (2011).  This Article will not attempt 
to address the varying types of preemption, given that the suggestion made here calls for 
federal action expressly preempting state money transmitter legislation insofar as it would 
otherwise reach crypto-based businesses. 
277. As noted in 2018, “[t]he several states rather than the federal government are the
primary regulators of money transmitters.”  Peter Van Valkenburgh, The Need for Federal 
Alternative to State Money Transmission Licensing, COIN CTR. REP., Abstract (v.1, Jan. 
2018), [https://perma.cc/2HK6-3ALC].  This has also been the subject of comment by the 
Chairmen of both the SEC and CFTC. 
Check-cashing and money-transmission services that operate in the [United 
States] are primarily regulated by states.  Many of the internet-based cryptocur-
rency-trading platforms have registered as payment services and are not subject 
to direct oversight by the SEC or the CFTC.  We would support policy efforts to 
revisit these frameworks and ensure they are effective and efficient for the digital 
era. 
Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are Looking at Cryptocurrency, WALL 
STREET J. (Jan. 24, 2018), [https://perma.cc/2B8W-2Q35].  
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long been regulated by the states.  As the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, when Congress legislates in a field which has been “tra-
ditionally occupied” by the states, courts “start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States were not to be 
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and man-
ifest purpose of Congress.”278  There is also precedent suggesting 
that the presumption against preemption “is not triggered when 
the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of 
significant federal presence,”279 such as exists in the case of na-
tional banking.280  Because cryptoassets are designed to be multi-
jurisdictional, there is certainly an argument that could be made 
that any presumption against preemption of state law should not 
apply.281 
This Article recognizes the risk that implied preemption 
would not be available, and therefore the suggestion posited here 
is that Congress should expressly and clearly removed inter-
state282 crypto-based money transmitter activities from the pur-
view of state money transmitter statutes.283  In deciding how to do 
this, the federal government might, for example, choose to borrow 
language from one of the states that has removed crypto from the 
scope of state money transmission requirements. 
One such state is Wyoming, which specifically amended its 
Money Transmitter Act to make it clear that the act does not apply 
to “[b]uying, selling, issuing, or taking custody of payment instru-
ments or stored value in the form of virtual currency or receiving 
virtual currency for transmission to a location within or outside 
278. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
279. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000); see also Peck, supra note 276,
at 1195 (“The presumption does not apply where there has been a history of significant fed-
eral presence . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
280. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 554 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing). 
281. Bank of Am. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 589 (9th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Locke, 529 U.S. at 108). See also Wachovia Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d 
Cir. 2005) (“‘The presumption against federal preemption disappears, however, in fields of 
federal regulation that have been substantially occupied by federal authority for an extended 
period of time. Regulation of federally chartered banks is one such area.’”) (quoting Flagg 
v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 2005)).
282. A purely intrastate business would remain subject to state law, but given the na-
ture of cryptoassets, this is not likely to affect many crypto-based business operations. 
282The purpose of this preemption would not be to eliminate regulation, but to establish a 
unified regulatory regime at the federal level instead. 
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the United States by any means . . . .”284  That statute also defines 
“virtual currency” to mean “any type of digital representation of 
value that: (A) Is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account 
or store of value; and (B) Is not recognized as legal tender by the 
United States government.”285  This is in accord with FinCEN’s 
treatment of virtual currencies as “a medium of exchange that op-
erates like a currency in some environments, but does not have all 
the attributes of real currency.”286  The missing attribute identified 
by FinCEN is that virtual currency is not currently recognized as 
legal tender which could easily be added if and when it becomes 
likely that the U.S. would choose to recognize a virtual currency 
as legal tender. 
Essentially the same exemption and definition could be used 
in the BSA, precluding states from regulating such businesses as 
money services or money transmitter businesses.  Because the 
purpose of preemption is to avoid inconsistent state regulation, 
and not to avoid all regulation of such businesses, the language at 
the federal level would also need to limit the exemption from state 
law to businesses licensed pursuant to federal law to the extent 
that they are involved with the listed activities.  A rogue business 
operating outside the scope of federal regulation should not be 
exempt from state oversight. 
Since preemption begins with the inquiry as to whether Con-
gress intended to preempt state law, an unambiguous statement 
such as the foregoing should make it clear that states would not 
retain the authority to regulate virtual currency businesses as 
money transmitters, so long as they are licensed at the federal 
level.  This would naturally necessitate increased federal over-
sight, since the current federal approach focuses on registration of 
these businesses with AML and CTF compliance in mind, rather 
than with the goal of licensing to ensure adequate safety and 
soundness for consumer protection.  The switch to federal licens-
ing would require a more detailed application process at the fed-
eral level, a substantive review of the materials provided, and a 
decision at the federal level about appropriate bonding or security 
284. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-22-104(a)(vi) (2020).
285. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-22-102(a)(xxii) (2018).
286. 2013 Guidance, supra note 13.
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requirements, minimum net worth obligations, and any limita-
tions on permissible investments (keeping in mind the nature of 
the underlying business).  
Rather than suggesting that Congress should establish these 
standards, it would seem preferable to delegate such rule-making 
authority to an appropriate agency.  While FinCEN currently 
oversees these very same businesses for compliance with AML 
and CTF requirements, it may not be the logical agency for safety 
and soundness review.  Instead, the federal Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB),287 whose creation was authorized by 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act in 2010, is a more logical choice.288  
287. It should be noted that various challenges have been made to the legitimacy of the
agency in the years since its creation.  See, e.g., Barbara S. Mishkin, D.C. Federal Court 
Dismisses Morgan Drexen Lawsuit Against CFPB, BALLARD SPAHR, 
[https://perma.cc/4H2A-78H8].  See also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Morgan Drexen, 
Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1082, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2014); PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
881 F.3d 75, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (upholding the CFPB against a challenge that its for-cause 
removal provision for commissioners violated the constitutional separation of powers).  No-
table in PPH Corp. is a dissent by now-Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, who would 
have invalidated the for-cause termination provision, instead allowing the President to re-
move the Director of the CFPB at will.  Id. at 200 (Kavanaugh, dissenting).  Cf. Consumer 
Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(finding that the CFPB “lack[ed] authority to bring [an] enforcement action because its com-
position violate[d] the Constitution’s separation of powers,” and declining to sever the for-
cause termination provisions) (internal quotations omitted).  On May 6, 2019, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals concluded in Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law LLC that the 
structure of the CFPB did not violate the Constitution, even though “the agency is headed by 
a single Director who exercises substantial executive power but can be removed by the Pres-
ident only for cause.” 923 F.3d 680, 682.  Although agreeing that the argument against the 
structure was “not without force,” the court nonetheless concluded that Supreme Court prec-
edents required the court to find the structure to be permissible.  Id. at 983.  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to decide the issue on October 18, 2019.  Id., cert. granted, 140 S. 
Ct. 427 (2019). The Court might have signaled a willingness to strike down the provision 
relating to the removal of a Director only for cause, by broadening the scope of certorari 
beyond the narrow issue raised by appellants. It did this by directing the parties to brief and 
ague the issue of whether, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) can be severed from the Dodd-Frank Act 
if the Court determines that the CFPB is unconstitutional on the basis of the separation of 
powers. 140 S.Ct. 427 (Mem). This same language also suggests that the Court might be 
willing to uphold the CFPB with a change in the removal powers of the President. In any 
event, the suggestions made in this Article are based on the assumption that the CFPB will 
continue in effect, either in its current form, or with a Director who is subject to at will 
removal by the President. 
288. See Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: An Overview, 68 BUS. LAWYER 557, 557 (2013). 
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The CFPB is a governmental agency responsible for con-
sumer protection in the financial sector.289  Its jurisdiction in-
cludes banks and other financial companies operating in the 
United States, making it a reasonable choice to oversee safety and 
soundness of crypto-based businesses.  The bureau has a history 
of consulting industry, consumers, and other external stakehold-
ers when considering new regulations and works to “carefully as-
sess the benefits and costs” of new requirements.290  Because 
small businesses and entrepreneurs would undoubtedly be im-
pacted by safety and soundness requirements such as minimum 
net worth and bonding obligations, the CFPB will be obligated to 
organize a Small Business Review Panel in order to insure that 
there is a strong justification for choices that the agency makes.291 
This suggestion will necessitate a change to the reach of the 
CFPB’s authority.  As of June 2019, the CFPB’s authority was 
limited to banks, thrifts, and credit unions with assets over $10 
billion, and larger participants in the consumer reporting, con-
sumer debt collection, student loan servicing, international money 
transfer, and automobile financing markets.292  This scope of au-
thority would need to be broadened in order to cover money trans-
mitter businesses that deal in cryptoassets. 
The actual regulations that the CFPB should impose in order 
to replace the myriad state safety and soundness requirements 
289. According to its own website, “[t]he CFPB implements and enforces federal con-
sumer financial laws to ensure that all consumers have access to markets for consumer fi-
nancial products and services that are fair, transparent, and competitive.”  Rulemaking, 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, [https://perma.cc/EYF7-KSUF]. 
290. Id.
291. The obligation to consult with this kind of group is derived from the Regulatory
Flexibility Act, which applies to the CFPB.  “When any rule is promulgated which will have 
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, the head of the 
agency . . . shall assure that small entities have been given an opportunity to participate . . . .”  
5 U.S.C. § 609(a) (2010).  Under the policies adopted by the CFPB, this includes formation 
and consultation with a Small Business Review Panel:  
Each Small Business Review Panel consists of representatives from the CFPB, 
the Small Business Administration’s Chief Counsel for Advocacy, and the Office 
of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.  The 
panel holds an outreach meeting with a representative group of small businesses 
. . . .  [The CFPB will] use that feedback to inform the rulemaking process. 
Small Business Review Panels, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, 
[https://perma.cc/7VKL-R8XM]. 
292. Institutions Subject to CFPB Supervisory Authority, CONSUMER FIN.
PROTECTION BUREAU, [https://perma.cc/R3LJ-4XDR]. 
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should be based on discussions with current state regulators and 
groups such as the CSBS, as well as with the small business panel 
described above.  After considering the range of fees, character 
standards, bonding requirements, minimum net worth obliga-
tions, limitations on permissible investments, and other safety and 
soundness regulations currently being applied to various money 
transmitters, a single application and examination based on a uni-
form set of standards should be implemented at the federal level.  
For multi-jurisdictional entities conducting their “money trans-
mission” activities through cryptoassets, compliance with these 
federal standards should preempt inconsistent state requirements. 
States, should however, be allowed to require filing of a reasona-
ble fee and notice that would include the name of the money trans-
mitter, and a list of agents and locations operating in each state.  
Given the reality that states have shown no tendency towards 
uniformity in their approach to regulation of payment transmit-
ters, it does not make sense to wait for them to adopt changes to 
their statutes and regulations.  Notwithstanding efforts by groups 
such as the ULC and CSBS to encourage consistency and coop-
eration, vast differences in ideology and approach make it almost 
inconceivable that uniformity will be achieved by the states acting 
alone. 
In this instance, the benefits of allowing states to experiment 
with approaches to regulation appear to be outweighed by the 
problems posed by inconsistent regulation.  First, state-by-state 
regulation means that interstate operations may be forced to com-
ply with the most stringent state’s regulation or forego doing busi-
ness in that jurisdiction (and potentially in all U.S. markets if it 
becomes impossible to insure that residents of a particular juris-
diction are not served).293  Even if most states would welcome a 
particular product or service, a single state (particularly one with 
a lucrative market and a powerful lobby by existing market 
293. When it comes to online transactions, it is not always easy to know where a cus-
tomer is actually located.  For example, there are plenty of sources offering advice on how 
to hide I.P. addresses.  See, e.g., Max Eddy, How to Hide Your IP Address, PCMAG, 
[https://perma.cc/SJU9-DBRC]; (4 Super Easy & Fast Ways To (REALLY) Hide Your IP in 
2020, VPNMENTOR (Feb. 13, 2020), [https://perma.cc/CY27-RJG5]; How to Hide Your IP 
Address, WHATISMYIPADDRESS, [https://perma.cc/EYD3-L35T]. 
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participants) might have the effective power to preclude that op-
tion from being available anywhere.294 
Secondly, inconsistent regulations place new entrants into 
the payment services market at an unfair disadvantage.  Certain 
market participants, particularly banks, already have a relatively 
uniform regulatory framework,295  and it seems particularly unfair 
to subject new entrants into a market specifically designed to 
serve the unbanked296  to more difficult standards. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, the preceding materials offer a general basis for 
understanding how crypto-based businesses differ from conven-
tional money transmitters even though they may provide similar 
services.  In addition, the discussion of crypto business should 
also provide a framework in which to evaluate both the potential 
risks and benefits of the new technology in the sphere of money 
transmission.  
294. For a discussion of this possibility, see J. Parker Murphy, More Sense Than
Money: National Charter Option for FinTech Firms Is the Right Choice, 18 N.C.J.L. & 
TECH. ONLINE. 359, 388 (2017), [https://perma.cc/Q6XE-T7NZ].  “If lucrative markets are 
allowed to functionally dictate stringent requirements across the country, the overregulation 
could reduce the financial products available in small states.  This outcome would reduce 
competition in those markets as well as ensure that unbanked consumers remain unbanked.”  
Id. 
295. For example, “[s]tate money transmittal statutes, which are otherwise extremely
broad, often exempt banks.”  Knight, supra note 54, at 155.  Accordingly, non-bank entities 
seeking to offer money transmitter services “may find themselves under a different—and 
much less consistent—regulatory regime than their bank competitors.”  Id. 
296. Although it has not been a primary focus of this article, one of the original justi-
fications for crypto was to help the unbanked.  “It’s going to prevent wars, help the unbanked 
and bring honesty to financial systems.”  Kirsten Grind, Let Me Tell You Some More About 
Bitcoin Hello? Hello?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2018), [https://perma.cc/9C4M-H6UF] (internal 
quotations omitted).  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reported in 2017 
that as of that year, approximately 8.4 million U.S. households (or 14.1 million adults) were 
unbanked, and an additional 24.2 million households with 48.9 million adults were un-
derbanked.  FED. DEPOSIT INS.CORP., 2017 FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND 
UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 1 (Oct. 2018), [https://perma.cc/HN84-WGAE].  This is one 
of the most vulnerable populations in the U.S., and it seems particularly pernicious to limit 
services that might benefit them, or to restrict competition that might result in lower costs 
and better services for them.  For a further consideration of the plight of the unbanked, and 
the correlation between banking status and race, age, and employment status in the U.S., see 
generally Catherine Martin Christopher, Mobile Banking: The Answer for the Unbanked in 
America?, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 221 (2015).  
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The extended discussion of federal and state regulatory ap-
proaches is designed to explain, if not justify, the range of require-
ments applicable to crypto businesses that may be classified as 
money transmitters.  This background is necessary to appreciate 
the extent of the barriers to entry that the current system imposes 
on entrepreneurs that might find themselves regulated as money 
transmitters.  The lack of uniformity, despite efforts to promote a 
more consistent approach and widespread recognition of the prob-
lems that the current patchwork regulations have caused, appears 
certain to continue for the foreseeable future, unless there is fed-
eral intervention.  
The case for preemption of state regulation turns both on the 
success of the federal approach to AML and CTF requirements as 
administered by FinCEN, and the failures of the state approach, 
which appear to stifle innovation and competition at the state level 
in a way that unfairly protects conventional businesses and poten-
tially harms the unbanked who have not been able to afford con-
ventional banking services.  Admittedly, the suggestion of this 
Article, that the CFPB should be given preemptive authority to 
regulate inter-state crypto-based businesses for safety and sound-
ness requirements, requires a Congressional mandate for preemp-
tion, a determination that the CFPB’s authority and structure is 
constitutionally sound or an amendment to that structure; and an 
expansion of the CFPB’s jurisdiction to include crypto-based 
money transmitter businesses.  Nonetheless, the successes of that 
agency in advancing consumer interests and FinCEN’s successes 
in developing a reasonable approach to protect against money 
laundering and funding of criminal enterprises suggest that this is 
the optimal direction for regulatory reform.  
